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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report describes the preliminary safeguards concepts
necessary for nuclear-materials management in a thorium-uranium
fuel reprocessing plant. The thorium reprocessing plant is the
fifth in a series of nuclear facilities for which conceptual
designs of advanced nuclear-materials management systems have
been provided by the Safeguards Systems Group (Q-4) of the Los
Alamos Scientific Laboratory (LASL), under the direction of the
US Department of Energy's Office of Safeguards and Security
(DOE-OSS). These conceptual design studies are part of a con-
tinuing effort to develop improved safeguards systems for a broad
spectrum of nuclear fuel-cycle facilities. Previous reports
include safeguards systems for nuclear-materials management in
mixed-oxide fuel fabrication facilities (LA-6536), plutonium fuel
reprocessing plants (LA-6881), plutonium nitrate conversion
plants (LA-7011), and fast critical facilities (LA-7315).
This report and a companion study, "A Critical Review of
Analytical Techniques for Safeguarding the Thorium-Uranium Fuel
Cycle" (LA-7372), were prepared at the request of DOE's Nuclear
Production Division, in support of the Savannah River Labora-
tory's Alternative Fuel Cycle Technology (AFCT) Program. Subse-
quent studies for the AFCT will extend and quantify the findings
of this preliminary analysis and will include safeguards concep-
tual designs for facilities in which uranium and plutonium are
coprocessed.
This report addresses preliminary concepts for coordinated
safeguards materials management in a generic chemical separations
facility involved in reprocessing uranium-thorium fuels, using a
uranium-thorium-fueled light-water reactor (LWR) fuel reprocess-
ing plant as a reference facility. The process flow sheets for
the reference facility were modified from conventional Purex,
Thorex, and HTGR reprocessing technology by the LASL Safeguards
staff and may differ in detail from those finally adopted by the
AFCT. The report is preliminary in the sense that the concepts
iv
developed herein will be transferred eventually to the process
actually selected and quantified subsequently by modeling and
simulating the safeguards system and the final version of the
process and facility as a unit. As was done for the facilities
previously studied, the results of this activity will be reported
as an LA-series report that will supersede this LAMS-series
report.
Originally, reactor designs for the uranium-thorium fuel
cycle relied on initial core loadings of high-enriched uranium-
235235 ( U). Subsequent recycle cores were to contain high-
233
enriched uranium-233 ( U ) , produced from the thorium during
235 233
operation of the initial core, or mixtures of U and U.
Because both these uranium isotopes are usable in nuclear weap-
ons, nonproliferation considerations have invoked the concept of
denaturing these materials by diluting them with nonfissile
238uranium-238 ( U) to concentrations where they are no longer
useful for weapons (12% for U and 20% for U) . The sec-
ondary consequences of this dilution are a loss in economic and
neutronic efficiency and the production of significant quantities
of weapons-usable plutonium, which is not normally produced in
high-enriched uranium-thorium reactor systems. The plutonium-239
(* Pu) , formed by parasitic neutron capture in the U
present in denatured uranium-thorium reactors, is about one-third
of that produced in a LWR operated on the plutonium-uranium cycle.
The reference facility is designed to process first-
235
generation uranium-thorium (denatured U) startup fuels as
233
well as first-recycle and equilibrium (denatured u) uranium-
thorium LWR fuels, and to recover the plutonium generated in the
238
U denaturant. Fissile fuel content is limited to less than
0% U and to less than 12% " ° u in the denatured fuels.
Although several alternative modes of operation are dis-
cussed, safeguarding the reference facility is complicated by the
necessity to maintain four component streams separately:
235 233
co-recovery of U from initial core loadings and u
generated from thorium; thorium; plutonium; and fission products
and other wastes. Thus, the facility combines features fron fcvvo
chemical separations plants, one based on the Purex process, the
other on the Thorex process.
Because no facility of this nature has ever been demon-
strated, both the reference facility and its safeguards system
nust rely heavily on information extrapolated from extensive
experience with plutonium-uranium reprocessing facilities, and to
a lesser extent on information obtained from high-temperature
gas-cooled reactor (HTGR) studies. The process and safeguards
analogies for the uranium-thorium cycle are weakest in the areas
of dissolving the refractory thorium oxide fuels, disposing of
the plutonium produced in the denatured fuels, and resolving
problems associated with the greater induced radioactivity in
thorium recycle fuels.
232
Gross radiation effects arising from the presence of U
daughters and other secondary products of the denatured uranium-
thorium fuel cycle may be more readily addressed by process and
operations changes than at the safeguards and materials-saeasure-
nent level. Accurate materials measurement in the presence of
these gross radiation fields and the spectral radiation from the
entire suite of uranium isotopes plus plutonium, thorium, protac-
tinium, and their daughters has yet to be demonstrated under
realistic operational conditions.
It is undoubtedly true that this hostile radiation environ-
ment will tend to desensitize most measurement techniques below
the levels obtained with the relatively simple isotopic mixes
characteristic of conventional fuel reprocessing plants. The
quantitative extent of these effects will be addressed in a sub-
sequent report; however, this report discusses their general
influence, suggests means for improving this situation, and iden-
tifies areas requiring further development and treatment in the
projected detailed study and the subsequent final report.
Chapter I of this report briefly reviews the technical
basis for the thorium-uranium fuel cycle. Some of the reactor
concepts requiring aqueous reprocessing, and the aqueous
vi
reprocessing philosophy, are summarized in Chapter IT, A prelim-
inary flowsheet for reprocessing denatured thorium-uranium fuels
to produce separate thorium/ uranium, and plutonium product
streams is presented in Chapter III. A preliminary safeguards
system for this plant is proposed in Chapter IV, and the measure-
ment methodology required for the safeguards system is reviewed
in Chapter V. The conclusions of this preliminary study are sum-
marized in Chapter VI.
For the final report a plaint design to be selected by SP.L
will be computer-modeled as the reference facility and opera-
tional parameters will be simulated. Accountability measurement
techniques and the statistical sampling plans will be applied to
the simulated SNM inventories<. Alternative accounting and diver-
sion strategies will be evaluated and compared using decision
analysis tools adapted for this purpose. Reconunendations for the
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MATERIALS MANAGEMENT IN A THORIUM-URANIUM
FUEL REPROCESSING PLANT
by
E. A. Hakkila, J. W. Barnes, H. A. Dayem,
R. J. Dietz, and J. P. Shipley
ABSTRACT
This report addresses preliminary concepts
for coordinated safeguards materials management
in a typical generic thorium-uranium-fueled light-
water reactor (LWR) fuels reprocessing plant. The
reference facility is designed to recover thorium
and uranium from first-generation (denatured ^35^)
startup fuels, first-recycle and equilibrium
(denatured 2^^\J) thorium-uranium LWR fuels, and
to recover the plutonium generated in the 238JJ
denaturant as well.
In a subsequent report a specific reference
plant design selected under the Alternative Fuel
Cycles Technology Program will be modeled and
operational parameters will be simulated using
the concepts developed here. Recommendations for
the most effective safeguards system will be made
on the basis of these comparisons.
I. INTRODUCTION
Thorium-based reactors have been proposed to extend world
energy reserves, and more recently, as a means for improving the
proliferation resistance of the nuclear fuel cycle. Thorium is
not fissile and unlike uranium, it is of no value as a primary
232
nuclear fuel. However, m an operating nuclear reactor Th
?31 >^S 9̂ 9
is converted to U which, liKe U and Pu, can be
used to produce useful energy. Uranium-233 also can be used in
nuclear weapons and therefore must be safeguarded.
Thorium-based fuels can be substituted for uranium-based
fuels in most reactor systems, with some tradeoffs in such areas
as reactor behavior and fuel-cycle economics. It is not the pur-
pose of this study to review or assess the physics and economics
of the various reactor systems except to the extent that fuel and
cladding types and fuel-utilization philosophy are important in
designing fuel reprocessing facilities and, hence, for designing
integrated safeguards materials control and accountability sys-
tems for these facilities.
Conventional light-water reactors (LWRs), heavy-water reac-
tors (HWRs), and liquid-metal fast-breeder reactors (LMFBRs) have
been studied extensively, and reactors using uranium and pluto-
nium as fuels have been or are being commercialized. These BYE-S' i ̂  ') \ Q ? x aterns are fueled with JU and/or J3Pu, with " U serving
as the fertile material. Regardless of whether or not the fuel
is reprocessed, some of the plutonium formed in these reactors is
consumed as fuel. In most of these conventional reactor systems
n "3 o
thorium can be suostituted for U as the fertile material.
In addition, thorium is used in high-temperature, graphite-
moderated, gas-cooled reactors (HTGRs) and light-water thermal-
breeder reactors (LWBRs).
233The U that is produced in thorium-basod reactors can
be used to fuel succeeding generation reactors; however, because
233
U does not occur in nature, the reactor must be loaded
235initially with either U-enriched uranium or plutonium.
Until now, most reactor concepts have relied on using high-
enriched (93%) U for the initial loading and essentially
233pure (reactor-grade) U for second-generation reactors. This
approach is driven largely by overall fuel-cycle economics and
neutronic efficiency. Present United States nonproliferation
235policies dictate that uranium containing more than 20% U or
233
12% U cannot be used as commercial reactor fuel because at
these higher enrichments the materials theoretically are usable
2
in weapons. Future reactor designs therefore must be based on
O "2 Q
diluting the fissile isotopes of uranium with U (denaturing).
Irradiation of the denatured fuel in fast or thermal reac-
•>
238r
239tors leads to the production of Pu by neutron capture in the
U diluent. Plutonium production is not considered to be a
rafeguards problem in nighly enriched uranium fuel cycles, which
produce only small amounts of plutonium, primarily Pu formed
235by a series of neutron-capture reactions from U. The
o o o
Pu, although highly toxic because of its high specific
activity, is not useful as a weapons material. Plutonium pro-
2 o SJ 239
duced from U, however, consists largely of Pu with
240 241 242
lesser amounts of Pu, Pu, and Pu, and is weapons
usable. A significant feature on the denatured fuel cycle is
that weapons-grade uranium is essentially eliminated, but at the
expenss of producing weapons-grade plutonium. The plutonium pro-
duced in the denatured fuel cycle is of the order of 20-35% of
that produced in conventional LWRs and therefore requires nearly
the same stringent safeguards measures.
235Conventional LWR fuel initially enriched to 3% U con-235
tains 1% U and 1% plutonium at discharge. Reprocessing of
this fuel recovers this fissile inventory but is not necessary
for the short-term continuance of the LWR fuel cycle. Although
the once-through or stowaway fuel cycle is being proposed as an
alternative to reprocessing conventional LWR fuels, it will be
necessary to reprocess these fuels to obtain fissile fuel for
starting up any uranium-fueled breeder reactor such as the LMFBR.
The once-through fuel cycle is not a rational alternative
to reprocessing in the thorium fuel cycle. The "raison d'etre"
233
for the thorium fuel cycle is to generate U fuel for succes-
?3^sive reactors, though some of the " ~U is burned in situ in the
first generation reactor. Reprocessing of thorium fuels, there-
fore, is necessary for continuance of the thorium cycle because a
large fraction of the fuel value otherwise would be discarded.
Thorium reprocessing technology will depend on the reactor
design and fuel utilization philosophy. The reprocessing alter-
233natives can range from recovering only U to recovering
233 235
thorium, U, U, and plutonium in separate streams or
coprocessing any combinations of these streams. This report will
address primarily the technology for the aqueous reprocessing of
separate streams as proposed in the Alternate Fuel Cycle Tech-
nologies (AFCT) Program being administered by the Savannah River
Laboratory (SRL).1'2
II. URANIUM-THORIUM FUEL CYCLE CONCEPTS
As noted in the previous section, a number of concepts have
been devised to extend energy resources by substituting thorium
for uranium in fission reactors. The main purpose of thorium
233
substitution is the production of fissile U in place of
239 233
Pu. A portion of the U is burned in situ; the remain-
der is reprocessed to fuel succeeding reactors.
The production chain for formation of uranium from, thorium
3 2 !3
is shown in Fig. 1. The main product is " U through the
233 233
Th- Pa chain, but other uranium isotopes are also pro-
235
duced. Formation of U is beneficial in that it is fissile.235However, U has an appreciable neutron-absorption cross sec-tion for forming U, which is a parasitic absorber and
reduces the number of neutrons available for continuing the fis-
sion and conversion processes. Thus, in the overall neutron
236economy, U is a poison, and fuel containing a significant
*\ O €Z
concentration of U must eventually be discarded.
233An important side effect in the production of U is the
232formation of low concentrations of U resulting from succes-
230
sive neutron absorption by Th or by an (n,2n) reaction from
Th, Pa, or " J O . The formation and decay of ° U is
summarized in Fig. 2 (Ref. 4). For either of the (n,2n) reactions
232
a neutron energy >6 MeV is required, and formation of U
through these reactions is not significant in well-theraialized
230 232
reactors. The Th thus becomes the main source of U.
Pig. 1. Nuclide chains from thorium irradiation.
The 230Th content of natural thorium varies between
5 232
and 100 ppm, depending on fuel source, hence the U con-
tent of the irradiated fuel will vary. The U is an alpha
emitter with a half-life of 72 yrs/ and as such, poses no severe
problems. However, one daughter in the decay chain. 208Tl,
emits a 2.6-MeV gamma ray, and for this reason all fuel manipula-
233
tions of reprocessed U produced in power reactors, including
analytical chemistry, must be performed in shielded caves. The







233is the ' Pa intermediate
(see Fig. 1). In conventional
Purex (plutonium and uranium
recovery by extraction) repro-
cessing an appropriate cooling
time of at least 150 days
between reactor discharge and
reprocessing is required to
permit decay of a large frac-
tion of fission products. This
is necessary to minimize prob-
lems in reprocessing associated
with solvent heating and rea-
gent degradation. For repro-
cessing of thorium fuels this
cooling period must be observed
not only for reprocessing but
also for nuclear safeguards
safeguards
Fig. 2. Production and decay
chain for 2 3 2u.







233precursor of U. Because almost 1 kg of 27-d
present per metric tonne of fuel discharged, a cooling period
of ^180 days is required to reduce the protactinium content to
<1O g. For shorter cooling periods the unrecovered protactinium
would decay to 233U, which could subsequently be reprocessed.
In a second recovery campaign this second batch of reprocessed
233 232
U would be essentially free of U contamination, and
232
hence of natural spiking from the u daughters.
In the Thorex (thorium and uranium recovery by extraction)
or acid-Thorex processes protactinium is removed with the bulk of
the fission products in the first extraction column. Flow sheets
233have been described for the recovery of U or protactinium
from the high-acid wastes. After a suitable aging time to permit
233 233
decay of Pa to U, the uranium can be recovered by an
additional solvent extraction cycle. Protactinium can be recov-
ered, without aging, by carbinol extraction or by coprecipita-
tion with sodium chromate or manganese dioxide. Protactin-
iur also has been separated from short-cooled, irradiated thorium
by adsorption on unfired Vycor glass. '
An important consideration in nuclear fuel use is the num-
ber of neutrons produced per neutron absorbed in the fissile iso-
topes (r,.). To achieve criticality in an ideal reactor (no neu-
tron leakage or parasitic absorption) at least one neutron must
be produced for each neutron absorbed (n = 1). If an ideal reac-
tor is to breed fuel then at least two neutrons must be produced
per absorption (n = 2) : one to initiate the next fission and the
balance to be absorbed in a fertile isotope to produce a fissile
atom. A value of n between one and two indicates that the reac-
tor converts some fertile material to fissile material but the
reactor is a net user of fissile material. In practice ideal
reactors cannot be built because of leakage, parasitic reactions,
etc., and for sustained breeding n must be significantly >2. The
value for ri is a function of the energy of the neutron absorbed
233 235
by the fissile isotope and is shown for U, U, and
239Pu in Fig. 3.12
All three fissile isotopes have a sufficiently high n to
233breed at fast-neutron energies; however, only U will breed
with both thermal and epithermal neutrons. This has led to the
12
development of the light-water breeder concept. Even non-
233
breeding U-fueled thermal reactors have a higher conversion
235
ratio than U- or plutonium-fueled reactors, and this has
given impetus to developing other thorium thermal reactor con-
cepts such as the HTGR.
A_. Thorium-Based Reactor Concepts
Some of the thorium-based reactor concepts will be dis-
cussed briefly to compare features that may be important in the
development of safeguards systems for the accountability of stra-
tegic nuclear materials in fuel reprocessing.

1. Light-Water Reactor. Conventional LWR fuel rods con-
238 235
sist of UO~ approximately 3% enriched in U. In
235second-generation reactors some of the U may be replaced by
reprocessed plutonium.
The thorium LWR fuel cycle is initiated by replacing some
TOO
of the U with thorium to breed U (Refs. 1 and 2). The
amount of thorium that can be added is dictated by the nonprolif-
eration requirement to maintain the 235U enrichment below 20%.
For first-generation reactors the fissile fuel consists of
O o c *y o Q
U, with both U and thorium as fertile material. Thus,
933
Plutonium as well as U is formed, the plutonium content of
the discharged fuel being 20-35% of the amount formed in conven-
tional LWRs.
Second-generation reactors can be fueled with recovered
235 233
U and U mixed with thorium, or plutonium mixed with
thorium. Compositions for first-generation (fresh) and second-
generation (recycle) fuels for the reference reactor are summa-rized in Table I.13
TABLE I




















Pu (all isotopes) 4.91
Reprocessed uranium must be re-enriched prior to recycle.




will be done by blending with highly enriched (50-93%) U to
decrease uranium feed and separative work requirements.
Because both highly enriched uranium and plutonium are used in
thorium fuel-element fabrication, a basic assumption in prelimi-
nary design of the reference LWR fuel cycle is that the repro-
cessing, conversion, and fuel fabrication plants will be
co-located in a secure area.
The reference thorium-based LWR fuel cycle has assumed
co-mixing of fertile and fissile materials in the fuel and hence
233 235coprocessing of U and u in a single stream. One conse-
quence of this mode of operation is the buildup of U in the
TIC O "J C.
fuel by neutron absorption in U. The U is a parasitic
absorber, resulting in eventual poisoning of the fuel. An alter-
235
native fuel concept is the seed-blanket, where the fissile U
and fertile thorium are placed in separate fuel rods in the reac-
tor. The fuel rods are physically sorted prior to reprocessing.
The fissile rods are chopped, dissolved in HNCU, and uranium
and plutonium are recovered by a Purex process. The fertile rods
are chopped, dissolved in HNO-j containing a low concentration
of HF, and uranium and thorium ace recovered using a Thorex pro-
233 235cess. Thus, U and U are maintained separately and the
235 236
U can be discarded when U buildup becomes excessively
high, possibly after two or three irradiation cycles.
One of the major difficulties in reprocessing thorium-based
fuels compared to uranium-based fuels results from the relative
insolubility of ThO2. Magnesium oxide may be added to the fuel
during fuel fabrication to facilitate ThO- dissolution.
The fuel cladding may be either stainless steel or
Zircaloy. The latter provides some advantages in neutron effi-
ciency and will be used in the reference design. This will pro-
duce some problems in fuel dissolution because the Zircaloy will
dissolve in the HNO,-HF mixture required to dissolve ThC^r
and the dissolved zirconium will complex the fluoride, rendering
it ineffective in aiding ThO2 dissolution. The dissolved
10
zirconium will also compete with the fission products in the
first extraction cycle, reducing the decontamination efficiency
and increasing the waste vo? ames.
2. Light-Water Breeder Reactor. The LWBR is a thermal
breeder, similar in some respects to the LWR, but with a reactor
core designed to optimize the neutron yield per fission, n , and
to minimize neutron loss so that breeding can occur. Thus, the
reactor becomes a net producer of fuel. The concept was devel-
oped by Westinghouse and a test core is being irradiated in the
12Shippingport reactor.
Three initial loadings or prebreeder core concepts have
been proposed. (Ref. 12, p. IX.G.1-4). The primary prebreeder
235
concept uses low-enriched (10-15%) U in thorium to provide
an overall fissile concentration of 3-4%. The second concept
uses a mixture of low-enriched uranium and plutonium to provide
the required fissile content. The third concept uses high-
enriched (90%) U with ZrO^ and a fissile concentration
relative to thorium of 3-4%.
233
The breeder fuel assembly contains enriched (75-80%) u
in thorium in seed and blanket rods, with ThCU axial and radial
reflectors. (Ref. 12, p. IX. G. 1-6) . Fuel cladding for both
prebreeder and breeder fuel elements is projected to be Zircaloy.
A significant difference between fast- and thermal-breeder
fuels results from the lower penetration of neutrons into the
fuel element in the thermal breeders. Thus, for the latter a
significantly larger fraction of both fission and breeding occurs
in the outer portions of the fuel rod, and the potential for
cladding interactions with the bred uranium is greater. This may
affect measurements of residual fissile material in leached
hulls. Reprocessing of LWBR fuels would be similar to LWR fuels.
3. Fast-Breeder Reactor. As with the uranium-plutonium
fuel cycle, fast breeders can be designed around the uranium-
thorium cycle, and a concept based on a mixed uranium-thorium-
14
plutonium-oxide fuel has been described. Fast-breeder fuels
consisting of mixed oxides and metal alloys have been studied.
11
Cladding for FBR fuels could be stainless steel or
Zircaloy. Reprocessing FBR oxide fuels would be similar to LWR
fuels, but probably with reduced throughputs if higher burnups
are used. Metal fuels may require modification in dissolution
procedures.
4. High-Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor. The HTGR b has
been under development both in the United States and abroad since
the 1950's. Its attractiveness lies in lower fuel costs, partly
due to the elimination of cladding, and a higher conversion ratio
than in LWRs. Both fissile and fertile fuels are present as
small carbon-coated particles (microspheres or beads) distributed
throughout a graphite fuel matrix.
The initial loading of the reactor core uses U as the
fissile material, with an enrichment of up to 93% (referred to as
1M fuel). In addition to the 93% enrichment (high enriched),
enrichments of 20-30% (medium enriched) and 10% (low enriched)
are being considered. The Th/U ratio is nominally between 5 and
10, depending on reactor design. The US HTGR reactors such as
235Fort St. Vrain are designed for 90% burnup of the U in the
initial high-enriched loading. During this time (̂ 6 yrs) 70
232 233
atoms of the Th have been converted to U per 100 atoms
235 233
of U fissioned, and approximately half of this U has
undergone fission.
The fuel from the initial loading still contains signifi-
235
cant amounts of U when the fuel is discharged, and recovery
235
of the U value is desirable. However, during burnup signif-
•p -^ /"
icant amounts of U, a neutron poison, are produced. Hence,
it is planned that this uranium will be reprocessed only once
(referred to as 25R fuel)p the second discharge will be discarded
without reprocessing (referred to as 25RW or 25RS fuel), which,
because of its U content, has a marginal fuel value. Some
Plutonium also is produced in the initial fissile loading from
238
neutron absorption by U as well as successive capture in
236
U, with the Pi?/U ratio ^0.005 to 0.01. The plutonium pro-
duced can be coprocessed with the recoverec uranium and used to
12
increase fissile content of 25R fuel, or it can be cycled to
high-level liquid waste with the fission products.
A third type of fissile fuel consists of the recovered
233
U from fertile fuel and is referred to as 23R fuel. It is
anticipated that approximately one-half of subsequent loadings of
the reactor will be with 23R fuel.
The fissile fuel particles consist of a UC2 (or UC^)
core surrounded by a buffer and a three-layered coating. The
buffer layer is porous graphite to absorb fission-product gases,
the inner layer is dense pyrolytic graphite, the intermediate
layer is SiC, and the outer layer consists of dense pyrolytic
graphite. The Sic serves two purposes: it helps to retain fis-
sion products within the kernel, and it aids in subsequent separ-
ation of fissile and fertile particles during reprocessing. This
triple layering is referred to as Triso coating.
A German pebble-bed HTGR uses graphite spheres ^6 cm in
diameter for fuel. The reactor is designed for continuous
235
refueling, and can be operated on low-enriched U or uranium-
17 235
thorium fuels. Each fuel ball contains ^1 g of U (or
U) and 5 g of thorium, either as the oxides or carbides.
Tlie fuel matrix compositions and fabrication techniques are sim-
ilar to those used in conventional HTGRs.
5. Heavy-Water Reactor. The primary development of the
HWR has taken place in Canada, and has been commercialized world-
wide with the CANDU reactor. The fuel consists of U0 2, and
generally is considered a "throwaway" fuel cycle, i.e., no
attempt is made to recover the converted plutonium. Studies are
235
being performed to substitute ThCU containing enriched U
19
as fuel for the CANDU. Reprocessing of the fuel will be
233required to recover the U.
B̂ , Reprocessing
^
The reprocessing of uranium-thorium fuels differs sig-
nificantly from reprocessing in the uranium-plutonium cycle. Two
types of headend will be required: a chop-leach process for oxide
13
fuels such as in the reference LWR or LWBR, and a burn-crush pro-
cess for HTGR-type graphite fuels. The oxide can be dissolved in
HNO^ if only uranium and plutonium are present, but addition of
a small amount of HF in the HNO3 is required if thorium is
present. Magnesium oxide is added to ThO9 fuels in the refer-
2ence process to further facilitate dissolution.
Solvent extraction for first-generation fissile fuel is
performed using a conventional Purex scheme. The thorium-based
fertile fuels require a Thorex extraction process. Second-
generation fuels can be reprocessed in a modified Thorex process
with separate product streams for thorium, uranium, and plutonium.
1. Headend. The chop-leach process has been developed and
tested extensively for conventional LWR fuels. Approximately
1 metric ton (MT) of oxide fuel is chopped into pieces 2.5-13 cm
(1-5 in.) in length, producing ^290-390 kg of Zircaloy and/or
stainless-steel hulls. It is anticipated that crimping of fuel
rods during chopping will be minimal due to irradiation embrit-
tlement of fuel-rod cladding. Some fines will be produced during
chopping, consisting primarily of Zircaloy and metallic noble-
metal fission-product ingots that may contain alloyed uranium and
21Plutonium.
For the graphite-based fuels the spent fuel elements, which
consist of graphite containing a mixture of fertile and fissile
beads, are crushed to pieces that can be handled in a fluidized-
bed burner. The graphite/thorium ratio is >200, and burning is
the only practical means for removing the large amounts of car-
bon. Burning is performed in a fluidized bed at ^825°C removing
the unprotected carbon particle coatings as well as the graphite
fuel matrix. An alternative concept calls for whole-block burn-
ing of fuel elements without crushing. In either case, burn rate
must be controlled to prevent thermal cracking of the SiC coating
on fissile beadsf which would result in crossover of ^ u and
2 3 5 u . 1 6
After the carbon has been removed, the fissile and fertile
particles are separated by pneumatic classification. The
14
uncoated fertile ThO2 particles have a density of 10, whereas
the SiC-coated UC2 particles have a density of 3. Using a dif-
ferential density method, separation, is achieved with a crossover
of <1% of fertile and <5% of fissile particles.
In an alternative separations scheme, the uncoated fertile
particles ace dissolved directly after burning. The SiC-coated
fissile particles are then crushed and the UC2 cores are dis-
solved separately for reprocessing.
2. Dissolution. For first-generation uranium-based fuels
the chopped fuel segments fall into a dissolver containing hot 3 M
to 8 M HNO^ (and gadolinium nitrate for criticality control),
which dissolves the solid UO2-PuO2-fission product matrix.
Chopped thorium-based fuel will be dissolved in ^ 12 M
HNCK-0.05 M HF. Some Zircaloy cladding also will dissolve,
complexing the fluoride and retarding the dissolution rate.
Addition of MgO to the ThO2 fuel during fabrication is being
considered for the reference process to facilitate dissolution.
For graphite-based fuels the oxide produced from the burner
is dissolved in a solvent 11-13 M in HNO,, ^0.05 M in HF, and
^0.1 M in A1(NO3)^ (Thorex solution). The solution is cen-
trifruged to remove solids, which presumably consist primarily of
metallic fission product ingots and any intact triso-coated fis-
233
sile particles. The metallic ingots could contain some u.
3. Solvent Extraction. A modified Thorex process having
separate product streams for thorium, uranium, and plutonium is
proposed for the reference facility. The process is described in
more detail in Chap. IIT.
4. Wastes. Solid, liquid, and gaseous wastes are gener-
ated from reprocessing oxide or graphite-based fuels. Gaseous
wastes do not present safeguards problems and are not considered.
a. Solid Wastes. The primary solid wastes from repro-
cessing LWR-type oxide fuels are the hulls and miscellaneous
15
packaged process wastes. The high-level waste hulls are moni-
tored for fissile content using either gamma-ray or neutron-
interrogation techniques.
Solid wastes from reprocessing HTGR-type graphite fuels
consist of fines collected on filters during crushing, SiC hulls,
235and spent U fuel elements. The fines on HEPA filters may
contain ^0.1% of the actinides in the fuels (Ref. 22, p. 15).
However, another study showed that as much as 1% of the original
uranium was found on the filters, and leaching with HNO^
removed less than 50% of the uranium (Ref. 5, pp. 64-66).
The centrifuge sludge containing the Sic hulls from fissile
fuel particles and metallic ingots of noble-metal fission prod-
ucts, are expected to contain <10% of the fission products and
<0.1% of the uranium (Ref. 22, pp. 16; Ref. 24). However, a
recent study showed that as much as 0.6% of the uranium may
23
remain undissolved with the centrifuge solids. If this is
the case, an accountability measurement must be made, or an addi-
tional reprocessing step must be added to recover the uranium.
In any evant, additional work is required to characterize the
form of the uranium in the insoluble material.
235
The 25RW fuel will contain ^4% of the uranium as U;
236
however, the high U content (^70%) renders it unusable for
further recycle. The beads can be stored as solids in high-level
wastes or stored as vitrified-matrix solid high-level wastes. In
either case, accountability measurements are required. Approxi-
mately 64% by weight of the nuclides present are actinides, and
^10% of the ^ ctinides are plutonium.
b. Liquid Wastes. Liquid wastes from both LWR or HTGR
reprocessing plants are expected to be similar and are classified
as low, intermediate, and high level. Low-level liquid wastes
(LLLW) are concentrated, then batch-transferred to high-level
wastes after measurement of SNM content. Intermediate-level
liquid wastes (ILLW) originate from the solvent and acid-purifi-
cation systems. These are measured for SNM content, then stored
in the ILLW storage tank. High-level liquid wastes (HLLW) are
16
generated from LLLW concentrate, fission product partitioning,
and centrifuge sludge and can contain appreciable quantities of
solids. These are stored in HLLW storage tanks after measurement
of SNM.
III. THE REFERENCE PROCESS
The reference process used for this study combines the
headend and plutonium purification system from an LWR Purex fuel
reprocessing plant with an HTGR Thorex solvent extraction system.
The preliminary conceptual process produces separate streams of
thorium, uranium, and plutonium as nitrate solutions. The basic
unit processes of the thorium fuel reprocessing flowsheets are
presented in Fig. 4. Technology for the fission product decon-
tamination and uranium partitioning, plutonium-thorium partition-
ing, and uranium purification are derived from a conceptual
25
design developed by General Atomic. The remaining unit pro-
cesses are based on Allied General Nuclear Services technology
20
for the Barnwell Nuclear Fuels Plant.
A. Design Capacity
The reference plant is designed to receive and process
irradiated uranium-thorium-oxide fuels. The plant is sized to
process 5 matric tonnes of' heavy metal per day (MTHM/day) or
1500/MTHM/yr of fuel with an average burnup of 33 000 MWd/MTHM.
The fuel is assumed to be Zircaloy or stainless steel clad having
a configuration similar to that of a typical LWR fuel bundle.
Composition of typical as-received fuel is given in Table II.
B_. Headend
1. Fuel Receiving, and Storage Disassembly. A process flow
diagram for the fuel receiving, storage, and disassembly opera-
tion is presented in Fig. 5. The spent-fuel assemblies arrive in












































Fig. 4. Flow schematic: thorium fuels reprocessing.




























































Fig. 5. Process flow diagram: fuel receiving,
storage, and disassembly.
TABLE II





















































weigh up to 100 tons/ provide radiation shielding to prevent
excessive exposure to operations personnel, prevent release of
hazardous materials should an accident occur during transit, and
provide a heat sink and thermal dissipation for the heat gener-
ated by the spent fuel. The massive casks and the specialized
equipment necessary for transport and handling also provide
pnysical security for their contents.
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Upon receipt at the facility, the cask and vehicle are mon-
itored for external contamination and washed to remove surface
dirt. The cask is removed from the vehicle to a test and decon-
tamination pit to check the condition of the fuel and cask cool-
ant. A cask cool-down system is used to reduce cask and fuel
temperatures to below boiling. Tbe cask is moved to the cask-
unloading pool and is lowered to the bottom of the pool where the
cask is opened and the fuel is removed. The fuel is transferred
to the fuel-storage pool and is stored until ready for reprocess-
ing. The fuel assembly remains in the storage pool as required
for decay and cooling prior to reprocessing.
When ready for processing, the fuel assemblies are remotely
transferred from the storage pool to a mechanical shear where
they are chopped into small segments. The chopped elements are
then heated in a moist oxygen atmosphere to remove tritium and
other volatile fission products (Voloxidation) .
2. Fuel Dissolution and Feed Preparation. Figure 6 pre-
sents a flow diagram for fuel dissolution and feed preparation.
Chopped fuel segments from the voloxidation system are charged to
a dissolver containing hot, concentrated HNO3- Fluoride may be
added to the dissolver solution to aid in dissolution. The dis-
solver solution is transferred to an accountability tank for sam-
pling and inventory control. The dissolver liquor is prepared
from fresh HNOg makeup, which contains recycled dissolver solu-
tion and hull-rinse liquor.
The solid hulls, consisting primarily of stainless steel or
Zircaloy fuel-element hardware and tubing remnants, are trans-
ferred to solid-waste disposal. The cladding hulls are rinsed,
monitored for fissile material, packaged, and transferred to the
solid-waste storage. These hulls may contain up to 0.1% of the
total incoming thorium, uranium, and plutonium.
Gases generated during dissolution are directed to the
off-gas treatment system, which removes particulates, radio-
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Fig. 6. Process flow diagram: fuel dissolution and
feed preparation.
After accountability measurements, the highly acidic dis-
solver solution is transferred to a continuous denitrator, where
the acid concentration is reduced to less than 1.0 M by boiling
in the presence of formic acid. The low-acid denitrator product
is cooled, centrifuged to remove solids, and adjusted to approxi-
mately 0.9 M Th and 0.5 to 1.0 M H + for use as feed to the
subsequent solvent-extraction systems.
£. Solvent Extraction
1. Fission-Product Decontamination and Uranium Partition-
ing. Figure 7 presents a flow diagram for fission-product decon-
tamination and uranium partitioning. The 1AF acid feed solution
is contacted with an organic extractant consisting of 30% TBP in
normal paraffin-hydrocarbon diluent (dodecane) . The TBP prefer-
entially extracts the thorium, plutonium, and uranium, leaving
about 99% of the fission products in the aqueous solution. The
organic stream from the contactor passes through a pulsed extrac-
tion column, where 0.25 M aqueous HNO3 solution strips thorium
and plutonium from the organic solution. The remaining organic
phase bearing the uranium flows to the 1C column where the ura-
nium is stripped from the organic into the aqueous phase.
2. Plutonium-Thorium Partitioning. Figure 8 illustrates
the plutonium-thorium partitioning system. The IBP stream enters
the IBP concentrator, where the plutonium and thorium concentra-
tions are increased by evaporation. The concentrated Pu/Th solu-
tion overflows the IBP concentrator into a feed adjustment tank
where the acidity is increased to about 2.0 M by acid addition.
The 2AF then passes to the 2A column where the plutonium and
thorium are extracted into organic solvent. The aqueous stream
(2AW) exiting the 2A column contains a significant concentration
of fission products and is routed to high-level waste process-
ing. The organic stream, (2AP), which contains the extracted
plutonium and thorium, overflows to the 2B column.
23
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Fig. 7. Process flow diagram: fission product
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Fig. 8. Process flow diagram: plutonium-thoriuni partitioning.
to
Trivalent plutonium is less soluble in the solvent than is
thorium. This difference is exploited to achieve partitioning
between the plutonium and thorium by control of HNO, concentra-
tion and relative flow rates of the various input streams and
addition of a reductant. The plutonium is stripped from the 2AP
by a stream (2BX) of 2 M HNO3, 0.1 M Fe(NO3)2/ and 0.2 M
N~H4. The thorium-bearing organic phase (2BT) passes to the
2C column where the thorium is stripped into a 0.7 M HNO,
stream (2CT) . The 2CT stream, devoid of plutonium, is sent to
thorium concentration and storage.
3. Uranium Purification. Final uranium purification is
achieved in a third solvent extraction cycle illustrated in
Fig. 9. Nitric acid is first added to the 1CU stream to provide
the necessary salting .strength. Uranium-bearing solutions are
purified and concentrated by extraction into organic solvent in
the ID column, stripping into an aqueous phase in the IE column,
and finally washing to remove trace organics in the 1W column.
After washing, the 1WU stream is concentrated to 2.0 M uranium
and routed to storage.
4. Plutonium Purification. Plutonium is purified as shown
in Fig. 10. Plutonium in the aqueous stream from the plutonium-
thorium partitioning cycle is reoxidized to the extractable
tetravalent state with nitrogen tetroxide and is preferentially
extracted into the TBP-organic solution in the 3A column. The
plutonium-bearing organic stream is scrubbed with HN03 to
remove extracted ruthenium, zirconium, and niobium. The organic
stream passes through a stripping column (3B) where further wash-
ing with dilute HNO3 strips the plutonium back into the aqueous
phase. The extraction-scrubbing sequence is repeated in another
plutonium cycle (4A and 4B columns) for further decontamination
from fission products. The plutonium-nitrate solution is washed
with an organic diluent stream to remove traces of TBP and then
is concentrated to 250 g/L. The plutonium-nitrate product solu-
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Fig. 10. Process flow diagram; plutoniuin purification.
D. Waste Treatment
1. Liquid Wastes. Spent solvents from the solvent-
extraction systems are washed with dilute acid to remove fission
products and with sodium carbonate to remove degraded TBP and
other organics. The radioactive aqueous-waste streams from the
solvent-extraction cycles and aqueous wastes from solvent treat-
ment are concentrated in the high-level or low-level waste con-
centrators. The acidic, high-level, concentrated bottoms are
stored in cooled stainless steel waste tanks, and the overheads
are fed to the low-activity waste concentrator. The overheads
from the low-activity waste concentrators are fed to an absorp-
tion column to recover HNCK and these overheads (primarily
water) are recycled as process water, or are sampled and released
to the stack. The recovered acid is used in process steps where
the residual radioactivity can be tolerated. The bottoms from
the low-activicy waste concentrator are fed to the high-activity
waste concentrator.
Miscellaneous process waste streams containing salts and
fission products are acidified, concentrated in a general-purpose
concentrator, and stored as intermediate-level liquid waste. The
condensed overheads from the general-purpose concentrator are
vaporized to the stack.
Miscellaneous low-level liquid waste streams such as waste
water from fuel storage, plant floor sumps, and cold chemicals
are sent to a service concentrator where the water is evaporated
and discharged to the stack. Miscellaneous waste streams con-
taining salts and fission products (<1 Ci/L and no appreciable
uranium or plutonium) are acidified, concentrated, and stored
with the intermediate-level liquid waste.
2. Gaseous Wastes. Off-gases from the dissolver are
scrubbed with circulating mercuric-nitrate nitric-acid solution
to remove radioactive iodine, and then are treated in an absorber
29
to convert nitrogen oxides to nitric acid suitable for recycl-
ing. The dissolver off-gas and vessel off-gas streams are com-
bined and passed through a second iodine scrubber containing
mercuric nitrate/ then through iodine adsorption beds and random
holdup beds, and finally through high-efficiency filters before
being released to the stack.
3. Solid Wastes. Waste solidification will be required in
the future. Liquid wastes will be stored pending completion of a
solid-waste conversion facility.
IV. THE SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM
The safeguards system must be incorporated into the plant
during early design stages. The design should consider process
and safeguards requirements for both systems operation and SNM
measurements. Some of the safeguards features are considered in
the following sections.
A. System Structure
The basic management, control, and coordination structure
of safeguards systems for domestic nuclear fuel cycle facilities
27—33has been described in several earlier reports. This
report does not address directly the problems of international
safeguards or interactions with the IAEA. However, it should be
recognized that the safeguards system structure discussed here
would form the backbone of an effective operator's safeguards
system in either national or multinational fuel cycle facili-
ties. Such a safeguards system would significantly ease the
application of IAEA safeguards.
A comprehensive safeguards strategy includes three func-
tions: (1) exclusion of all unauthorized persons from the facil-
ity, with further selective exclusion of others from sensitive
areas within the plant; (2) control of all activities involving
strategic nuclear materials (SNM) so that each such activity is
30
specifically authorized; and (3) confirmation that all materials
are contained in their proper locations. The system for imple-
menting that strategy must operate without unnecessary disruption
of plant operations, compromise of safety requirements, or
infringements on employee working conditions.
The following describes a system structure for accomp-
lishing these goals. More detail can be found in Ref. 34 as well
27-33as in earlier reports.
The general block diagram of the facility and the safe-
guards system is shown in Fig. 11, with those functions directly
related to the process enclosed in heavily outlined boxes. The
process-control function is distributed along the process and
item-operations lines in the form of local controllers, one for
each portion of the process. The actions of the process con-
trollers are supervised by the process-control coordination unit
(PCCU). This hierarchical control is usually implemented through
setpoint commands in which the operating point of each portion of
the process is specified by the PCCU on the basis of operational
authorizations, process-operation considerations, and safety.
Many portions of the process may be self-regulating, requiring
only that they be monitored for limit conditions.
The PCCU is also responsible for implementing safeguards-
related recommendations that affect process operations. This
implementation is necessary to ensure effective compliance from
both the safeguards and process-control viewpoints. The mate-
rials measurement and accounting system (MMAS) and the PCCU also
exchange process-related information to improve process operation
and safeguards effectiveness.
The safeguards coordination unit (SCU), described in more
detail in Refs. 30 and 31, supervises SNM safeguarding in the
facility. As the focal point for safeguards decisions, this unit
interacts with management and process-control coordination to
ensure effective safeguards. Safeguards coordination must be as
simple and reliable as possible, and its decision-making function
31
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Fig. 11. Structure of the safeguards system.
must be balanced to avoid frequent false alarms that cause unnec-
essary process disruptions, while maintaining a high probability
of effective response to any credible safeguards violation.
The SCU would normally rely on automated decision and con-
trol augmented by human supervision in abnormal situations.
Although it is the heart of the safeguards system, the SCU must
be carefully designed to minimize single-point vulnerability and
to reduce the time necessary to respond to rapidly developing
threats.
During normal process operation and when the safeguards
status of the facility is satisfactory, the safeguards system
performs primarily a monitoring function. Except for access con-
trol and some item operations discussed below, the safeguards
system normally has very little impact on process operations.
However, if a safeguards-related abnormality occurs, the SCU can
make recommendations to the PCCU aimed at enhancing the safe-
guardability of the nuclear material. The weight carried by the
SCU recommendation depends on the nature and severity of the
abnormality; as many such situations as can be reasonably fore-
seen should be detailed in a manual of standard operating proce-
dures.
The physical protection system (PPS) controls personnel
entry and exit for the facility and for restricted areas inside.
The system includes automated equipment snd enough guard forces
to provide effective response in an emergency. It expands the
conventional security functions, such as personnel control, to
include control of item-handling operations. This arrangement
provides more effective protection through remote, overriding
control of discrete material items in handling and storage. The
concept is applied only to those portions of the facility, such
as the loadout area, that are outside the closely coupled process
line where materials flow is not critical to smooth process
operations.
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The PPS provides appropriate information to the safeguards
system and
• excludes all unauthorized persons and contraband from
the facility,
• admits only essential persons to selected areas, and
• precludes unauthorized activities involving nuclear
material and vital equipment.
Important objectives in the design of the PPS are to auto-
mate its functions whenever possible and to harden the system
against subversion. These objectives are consistent with the
stated goal of reducing dependence on personnel reliability.
In the current concept of domestic safeguards, the
physical-protection and materials-accounting functions complement
and reinforce each other. In particular, the PPS protects not
just nuclear material, but the integrity of the MMAS as well.
Conversely, the MMAS confirms the effectiveness of the PPS. This
approach requires a high level of technological sophistication in
the system design and operation, supplemented by thorough and
frequent plant and safeguards inspections by a knowledgeable,
independent safeguards staff.
The design and evaluation of the PPS for these facilities
is the responsibility of Sandia Laboratories. This is discussed
in detail in Refs. 28, 29, and 33.
The MMAS is an implementation of the DYMAC concept,35'36
and is similar in principle to that already described for several
types of facilities. It combines conventional chemical analysis,
weighing, and volume measurements with the near-real-time mea-
surement and surveillance capabilities provided by NDA instrumen-
tation to enhance rapid and accurate assessment of the location
and amount of SNM in a facility. The concept of graded safe-
guards is employed to provide best measurement quality at the
product end of the process where SNM is most attractive to a
divertor.
The process-monitoring function combines elements of both
the PPS and MMAS and provides supplementary information to each
regarding compliance of actual process - operating modes with
34
approved procedures. The concept may be regarded as an extension
of physical-protection monitoring and surveillance functions into
the process line, and as an upgrading of the monitoring devices
(or appropriate placement of them) to allow gross materials
accounting.
The process-monitoring system collects timely information
to detect a theft in progress from a limited set of on-line mea-
surement equipment, plant-grade instrumentation, and other sim-
ple, reliable process-monitoring devices. The system uses plant
instrumentation wherever possible to assess approximate material
balances on transfers between tanks and across columns. Simi-
larly, an overall plutonium balance can be maintained. This bal-
ance is crude by accounting standards, but has the advantage of
near-real-time availability.
The system also uses an array of sensors to provide infor-
mation on the status of process valves; presence or absence of
liquid in process, sampler, and decontamination lines; status of
valves supplying sample or transfer jets; and pressures in
instrument lines. These sensors are all simple, rugged, and
relatively inexpensive. This report will not discuss the physi-
cal protection and process-monitoring systems beyond the brief
functional descriptions given.
The safeguards computer system plays an essential role in
implementing effective safeguards by collecting safeguards-
related data and maintaining and controlling the safeguards
information system. A major part of this role is the protection
of SNM; an equally important part is the operational effect of
the computer system on the processing of nuclear material. This
occurs because information provided through the computer system
forms the basis for all safeguards decisions, which may have
varying degrees of effect on the process. Erroneous or unavail-
able information can degrade decision quality and cause unnec-
essary process disruptions. Thus, the reliability and integrity
of the computer sytem directly affect economical operation of the
process.
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Several of the many possible computer and information sys-
tem implementations are discussed in Refs. 28 and 30. In addi-
tion, the TRW Defense and Space Systems Group, under subcontract
to Sandia Laboratories, is now investigating this area and refin-
ing alternatives. References 37 and 38 present some of their
preliminary results and discuss system security and reliability.
Reference 39 presents availability analyses for several alterna-
tive high-reliability computer systems.
Analysis of materials-accounting data for possible SNM
diversion is one of the major functions of the MMAS. The use of
unit-process accounting and dynamic material balances enhances
the ability to detect such diversions, but it also means that the
operator of the safeguards system will be inundated with mate-
rials accounting data. Furthermore, although these data contain
much potentially useful information concerning both safeguards
and process control, the significance of any isolated (set of)
measurements is seldom readily apparent and may change from day
to day, depending on plant operating conditions. Thus, the safe-
guards system operator is presented with an overwhelmingly com-
plex body of information from which he must repeatedly determine
the safeguards status of the plant. Clearly, it is imperative
that he be assisted by a coherent, logical framework of tools
that address these problems.
Decision analysis (see Refs. 3.1, 40-43) , which combines
techniques from estimation theory, decision theory, and systems
analysis, is such a framework, and is well suited for statistical
treatment of the imperfect dynamic material-balance data that
become available sequentially in time. Its primary goals are (1)
detection of the event (s) that SNM has been diverted, (2 estima-
tion of the amount(s) diverted, and (3) determination of the sig-
nificance of the estimates.
Decision analysis based on mathematically derived decision
functions is appealing because it can quantify intuitive feelings
and condense large collections of data to a smaller set of more
36
easily understood descriptors (statistics). It can also elimi-
nate personal biases and other errors caused by subjective evalu-
ation of data while providing a degree of consistency for the
decision process.
The safeguards system structure discussed above incorpor-
ates the latest safeguards concepts as determined by extensive
interactions with the nuclear industry and workers in the safe-
guards field. These concepts provide not only guidance in devel-
oping new systems, but also a means of assessing the effective-
ness of existing systems. The ideas are general enough to apply
to any of the proposed alternative fuel cycles with only changes
in detail.
The safeguards system can be implemented in many different
ways using various levels of hardware sophistication. These
range from completely automated, computerized systems to those
that rely extensively on the human element. The optimum configu-
ration is likely a mix of the two extremes, one that synergisti-
cally provides the best features of both.
B. Concepts for Thorium-Based Fuel Reprocessing
The materials flow for the thorium-based nuclear fuel plant
was described in Chap. Ill, and the safeguards system structure
was discussed in the previous section. The measurement method-
ology pertinent to materials accountability is reviewed in
Chap. V.
The materials-measurement philosophy will be based on
dividing the plant into as many individual materials-measurement
areas as is practical from process-control and measurement con-
siderations. Possible materials-measurement areas for the
thorium-based fuel reprocessing plant are shown schematically in
Fig. 12.
1« Fuel Receiving and Storage. The fuel receiving and
storage area is a separate materials-control area (MCA).
Accountability is by item control. The serial number of each
fuel assembly is identified visually and is checked against the
37
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Fig. 12. Proposed unit process boundaries and measurement points
for thorium fuel reprocessing plant.
accompanying shipping papers. The assemblies are stored in the
storage pool while awaiting transfer to the shear. Gamma-scanning
techniques may be applicable to verifying the existence of spent
fuel in fuel bundles or rods. Gamma or neutron methods may be
applicable to quantitative measurement of fissile content of
spent fuel in storage pools.
2. Fuel Chopping and Dissolution. The fuel chopping and
dissolution are performed batchwise on bundles of fuel elements
transferred from the fuel storage pool, with 1 MTHM of fuel per
dissolver batch. The fuel is chopped into segments 2.5-1? cm in
length, and the pieces are diverted to a dissolver basket.
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a. Leiched Hulls. If fuel bundles are comparable to
normal LWR fuel, each batch will yield approximately 290-390 kg
of leached hulls per MTHM. (Ref. 20, p. 4-29). The hulls con-
sist primarily of Zircaloy fuel-element cladding and stainless
steel end fittings, but may contain undissolved fuel or fuel that
has reacted with the Zircaloy to form compounds insoluble in the
HNO,-HF dissolver acid. Undissolved fuel may result from
crimping of individual fuel pieces or inadequate dissolution con-
ditions. In any event, hulls must be monitored for process con-
trol and safeguards considerations to assure that excess fuel is
not diverted to waste, and to measure the amount of fuel lost.
Either neutron or gamma-ray methods may be used to measure
fissile content of the hulls. A neutron method based on sponta-
neous fission and (a,n) neutrons yields a sensitivity of 2 mg of
4 44
Plutonium for a 10 -s measurement time. Because the spon-
taneous fission yield from uranium is significantly lower than
from plutonium, uranium sensitivity is expected to be signifi-
cantly lower (see Table III) .
An indirect method based on measurement of the 2.1-MeV
144gamma ray of Pr has been proposed (Ref. 20, p. 4-31; Ref.
45). The sensitivity of the technique is a function of fuel ele-
144
ment age due to the 284-day half-life of the Pr precursor,
144
Ce, and the method is not applicable for long-cooled fuels.
b. Dissolver Solution. It is probably not practical
to obtain an accountability measurement directly in the dissolver.
3. Fuel Reprocessing. The fuel reprocessing area from the
accountability tank through the thorium, uranium, and plutonium
product storage tanks can be treated as one large materials-
measurement area, or it can be subdivided into several smaller
areas (refer to Fig. 12). Each of the three product-purification
areas can be treated as separate measurement areas, with the
portion from the accountability tank through the partitioning
columns as a fourth measurement area. In order to better isolate
diversion detection and to reduce measurement uncertainties, the
multiple unit process approach will be considered.
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a. Accountability Tank Through Partitioning. The
accountability tank measurement is a key point, regardless of the
measurement strategy. The measurement is obtained by a combina-
tion of bulk volume and concentration. Volume measurement may be
either with a high-precision manometer after volumetric tank cal-
ibration or with load cells. The load cells theoretically could
provide higher accuracy, but isolation of the tank from asso-
ciated piping is required to eliminate damping and loading
effects.
Accountability-tank concentration measurements for thorium,
uranium, and plutonium can be made using isotope-dilution mass
spectrometry, or possibly x-ray fluorescence.
The outputs of the uranium partitioning and thorium-
Plutonium partitioning product streams may be measured at-line
using absorption-edge densitometry. It may be necessary to
incorporate an energy filter to minimize effects of fission-
47product and decay-daughter radiation. Alternatively, at-line
x-ray fluorescence could be used for all three product streams.
b. Uranium Purification. The input measurement to the
uranium purification will be the same as the output from the ura-
nijm extraction cell. The output from the uranium purification
area will be made after the product concentrator. Absorption-
edge densitometry using the K-edge may be applicable.
Recycle waste streams from the uranium purification area to
the partitioning area must be monitored. Uranium may be measured
using at-line polarography. Plutonium may be measured using in-
line alpha monitors.
c. Plutonium Purification. The safeguards account-
ability system for the plutonium purification area is anticipated
to be similar to the system described previously for a uranium-
plutonium fuel reprocessing plant. ^
d. Thorium Purification. The input to the thorium
purification area will be the same as the output from the
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thorium-plutonium partitioning cell, and may be measured using
at-line x-ray fluorescence or absorption-edge densitometry. The
output from the thorium concentrator may be measured using
absorption-edge densitometry or, possibly, gross density with an
acid and temperature correction.
Waste streams recycled to the partitioning columns can be
monitored for uranium using at-line polarography and for pluto-
nium using in-lina alpha monitors.
4. Product-Storage Areas. Product-storage tanks can be
monitored by concentration and volume, using a dip tube manom-
eter. Off-specification materials recycled through the purifica-
tion system must be measured using concentration and volume based
on batch transfers.
5. Liquid-Waste Tanks. Low-level liquid wastes are accum-
ulated on a batch basis, analyzed for total uranium, plutonium,
and thorium and concentrated for transfer to high-level liquid
wastes.
Intermediate-level liquid wastes, basically originating
from solvent purification systems, are accumulated on a batch
basis, analyzed for SNM, and transferred to the intermediate-
level liquid waste tank.
High-level liquid wastes, orginating from fission product
partitioning, low-level liquid waste concentrates, and centrifuge
sludge, are accumulated on a batch basis, analyzed for SNM, and
transferred to the high-level liquid wastes.
6. Solid Wastes. In addition to the leached hulls
described previously, miscellaneous solid process waste is accum-
ulated throughout the process area. The waste is packaged in
55-gallon drums. Accountability measurement methods based on
neutron or gamma-ray techniques must be developed and evaluated
for measuring SNM in these drums.
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V. MEASUREMENT METHODOLOGY
Both conventional chemical and nondestructive analysis
techniques will be required to implement a near-real-time mea-
surement control and SNM accountability system for a thorium-
based fuel reprocessing plant. Any analysis scheme must consider
such factors as standards, sampling, time of analysis, and appli-
cability to the measurement requirements. The subjects of con-
ventional and nondestructive analysis VNDA) techniques for safe-
guarding the uranium fuel cycle have been extensively treated in
30-32previous Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory (LASL) reports.
A critical review of analytical techniques for safeguarding the
thorium fuel cycle will be released concurrent with this report
48as LA-7372; a report emphasizing NDA techniques useful in
safeguarding the thorium fuel cycle is forthcoming.
A_. Standards
All procedures and instruments used for nuclear safeguards
accounting should be calibrated against approved standard refer-
ence materials. All weight and volume measurements should be
traceable to National Bureau of Standards (NBS)-certified weight
standards. Class S weights certified by the NBS are used as
reference standards for laboratory measurements. Volumes are
calibrated using appropriate NBS-certified weights as reference
standards.
The following primary standards are available for use as
oxidation-reduction standards in the nuclear safeguards account-
ability program:
• SRM 136c - potassium dichromate
• SRM 83c - arsenic trioxide, and
• SRM 40b - sodium oxalate.
SRMs available for uranium and plutonium analyses are shown in
Ref. 49, p. 42. The uranium isotopic standards are well suited
for the analysis of uranium-thorium fissile fuels. However, sec-
ondary standards must be prepared for fertile fuels because pri-
233
mary standards containing U are not available. In addition
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to the NBS standards, standards for the spectrographic determina-
tion of impurities in uranium are obtainable from the New
Brunswick Laboratory and the Oak Ridge National Laboratory.
Thorium primary standards presently are not available through the
NBS. However/ reference materials can be obtained from the New
Brunswick Laboratory, and the NBS has initiated a program t ~>
develop a thorium standard reference material (SRM).
Secondary or bench standards may be working standards
obtained from a source such as NBS, from various DOE contractors,
or from international sources. Alternatively, they may be
prepared from process solutions by characterization against NBS
SRMs. The preparation and evaluation of secondary plutonium-
52
nitrate standards have been described and should be incorpor-
ated into the analytical laboratory standard operating proce-
dure. The same techniques are applicable to preparation of ura-
nium working standards from plant uranium materials. These
standards should be analyzed daily or by each shift to ensure
that the method is under control. Process samples should not be
analyzed until satisfactory values are obtained on bench stand-
ards.
Primary standards for chemical analysis also can be used
for NDA applications, but generally must be incorporated into a
matrix to simulate process samples. This can introduce errors,
and these secondary standards must be evaluated for homogeneity,
etc. The New Brunswick Laboratory has initiated a program to
develop low- and medium-density NDA standards for uranium analy-
ses. The same techniq
rium reference materials.
ses. The same technique can be used for plutonium and tho-
B. Sampling and Sample Preparation
Measurements of process product and waste streams will
require analyzing solids as well as solutions and, in some cases,
heterogenous mixtures. Because of the high radiation levels
associated with most process materials, remote sampling tech-
niques will be required. The critical analytical points will be
the accountability and product-storage tanks. The waste streams
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will be of lesser importance but must be monitored, not only to
measure the amounts of thorium, uranium, and plutonium going to
waste, but to ensure that uranium and plutonium are not returned
to process vessels for subsequent diversion and waste discard
values overstated to conceal this action.
The air-lift samp? ing system should be designed to allow
for extensive recirculation of solutions through the sample lines
and the sample bottle during the sampling operation. Vessel
sparging, mixing time, and sample-circulation time should be con-
sidered in establishing proper sampling procedures for replicate
samples. Any solids must be dissolved after sampling and in-
cluded in the total analysis. For highly radioactive samples the
possibility of bubble formation must be considered in volume mea-
surements, and temperature corrections should be applied.
The main sources of sampling error for solutions are ex-
pected to be (1) concentration or dilution of the sample by the
air-lift system, (2) incomplete mixing of the solution in the
tank, (3) contamination of the sample in the sample lines, and
(4) sample heterogeneity caused by suspended solids. Where
analytical precision, expressed as relative standard deviation
(RSD), of better than 0.5% is required, all sampling should be
done on a weight basis rather than a volume basis. Remote volume
samplers can seldom provide routine precision better than 0.5%,
and even normal volumetric measurements generally are no better
than 0.2% on a routine basis.
A sampling apparatus capable of providing pipetting accur-
acy of ;+ 0.1% under hot-cell conditions has been described.
All steps including pipette rinsing are performed remotely, and
the Teflon piston surface does not touch the solution being
pipetted.
54C. Conventional Analytical Techniques
A number of chemical methods have been applied to the mea-
surement of thorium, uranium, and plutonium in a wide variety of
reactor-related materials. The methods are capable of providing
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precision better than 0.1% (la) with high accuracy. High sensi-
tivity (less than 1 mg) can be attained. Methods have been
developed and evaluated using natural thorium and uranium or
weapons-grade Plutonium, and should be re-evaluated for repro-
cessing-type materials.
Most analytical schemes for thorium, uranium, or plutonium
will require some separations from each other or from fission
products, by means of precipitation, solvent extraction, or ion
exchange techniques. Most separation schemes for these elements
take advantage of the multiplicity of valence states for pluto-
nium and to a lesser extent, for uranium. Thorium can be separ-
ated from both uranium and plutonium by oxidizing the latter to
U0 o and PuO 0 . Plutonium can be reduced to Pu or Pu to
2+
effect separation from UO2 •
With or without separation, a suitable method is selected
for analysis. The method should provide precision, accuracy,
sensitivity, and speed as required for safeguards and process
control considerations. A combination of conventional analytical
chemical and NDA methods may be used to satisfy these require-
ments.
1. Gravimetric Methods. Gravimetric methods rely on sep-
arating a compound of the element to be determined and igniting
it to a constant-weight stoichiometric compound. The method is
applicable only to relatively pure materials; impurities must be
determined using spectrographic or other procedures and the xinal
weight corrected by difference. Where clean separations from
impurities can be obtained, precisions of better than 0.1% often
can be realized. The method is applicable to purified thorium
and uranium product streams. However, it is difficult to obtain
a stoichiometric PuO2 product for weighing and this fact plus
the hygroscopic nature of PuO., makes gravimetry a less-than-
ideal method for determining plutonium.
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2. Spectrophotometric Methods. Spectrophotometric methods
rely on the property of a compound in solution to absorb mono-
chromatic light proportionally to concentration. The RSD attain-
able by direct spectrophotomet.ry generally is 0.5% or greater and
seldom is better than 0.2%. However, differential techniques can
improve the method to provide an RSD of ^0.05%.
Spectrophotometric techniques are applicable to reprocess-
ing samples, particularly to determinations of all three heavy
elements in waste streams. A method using tetrapropyl ammonia
has been automated for the sequential determination of uranium
and plutonium. ' A differential technique can be applied to
measuring Plutonium in product storage tanks with a precision of
0.05% (la).57
3. Electrometric Titrations. Amperometry, potentiometry,
and coulometry have been applied to the determination of uranium
and plutonium with RSDs better than 0.1%, and probably provide
the most accurate and precise methods for determining these ele-
ments in high-purity materials. The attainment or similar preci-
sion with reprocessing samples must be demonstrated.
Because the only oxidation-reduction couple for thorium,
0 4+
Th - Th , has a potential above that for the water couple,
electrometric titrations are unsuitable for measuring thorium.
4. Polarographic Methods. In-line or at-line polarography
has been investigated for determining uranium in reprocessing
samples. Conventional polarography using a dropping-mercury
electrode (DME) is a diffusion-dependent process and is appli-
cable only in quiescent systems. With suitable sampling, sparg-
ing, and cell-construction techniques the method has been applied
to determining uranium in waste streams with an RSD of 10%
(la) . The method is being investigated for determining ura-
nium in acid and organic60 waste and recycle streams in
Japan and in HTGR reprocessing waste streams in Germany.
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The method warrants consideration as an in-line or at-line
method for waste-stream uranium analysis in the reference
facility.
5. Complexometric Titrations. Complexometric titration,
primarily using (ethylenedinitrilo)tetraacetic acid, is appli-
3+ 4 +cable to determining thorium and Pu or Pu with an RSD of
0.1% (la/ . Complexometric titration will be a primary method for
determining thorium and is preferred over gravimetry because of
time considerations.
6. Mass-Spectrometric Methods. In most existing Purex
reprocessing plants thermai-ionisation mass spectrometry is used
to determine the amount of each isotope of uranium and plutonium,
and subsequently the effective atomic weights for calculating the
total uranium and plutonium from chemical analysis of samples
from the accountability tanks. Isotope-dilution mass spectrom-
etry can also be used to measure the plutonium and uranium con-
centrations in the tanks.
242 244For determination of plutonium? either Pu or Pu
can be used as the spike, with the latter preferred if available,
because it is not produced in significant quantities in the reac-
tor. Uranium~233 is used as the spike for analyzing conventional
233 235 7^1
LWR fuels. For U measurement U rather than Ju is
233
proposed as the spike because U is the major isotope to be
measured. Thorium-230 has been proposed as the spike for thorium
determination.
For determination of major isotopes, RSDs of 0.01-0.02%
(la) can be attained. The precision for well-characterized mate-
rials such as NBS SRMs generally is significantly better than for
process and product samples, probably reflecting problems in sam-
pling and sample preparation. Overall precision for measuring
dissolver samples has been in the range 0.3-1%, but may be im-
62proved to 0.1-0.2% with more stringent quality control.
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7. Aipha-Spectrometric Methods. Alpha spectroraetry is an
isotope- rather than element-specific analytical method, and is
O *3 Q
most suitable for determining Pu. With appropriate sample
preparation, it has been applied to measuring plutonium in pro-
cess samples of known isocopic compositions with an RSD of 3-5%
(la). The technique is particularly well suited to measuring
low1 plutonium concentrations in waste streams. In-line alpha
4
monitors having a/ 8 discrimination factors of 10 and providing
-4
linear response to plutonium concentrations in the range 10 -1
g/L have bean described for reprocessing streams. '
Alpha spectrometry also can be used for uranium analysis,
but low concentrations of plutonium can interfere seriously. The
technique is not applicable to the determination of thorium.
8. Fluorimetric Methods. Fluorimetry has evolved as a
standard method for determining small amounts (1-100 ng) of ura-
nium. The RSD for measuring uranium in simulated reprocessing
plant waste streams was reported to be 13%. A number of ele-
ments including thorium can interfere by quenching the uranium
fluorescence. The method is not applicable for determining
thorium or plutonium.
9. Specific-Ion Electrodes. Specific-ion-sensitive elec-
trodes have been studied for several years both for process
control and analytical end-point detection. The applications of
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ion-selective electrodes to on-line analysis has been reviewed.
Although electrodes generally are not specific for thorium, ura-
nium, and plutonium because all three are expected to behave
similarly in the tetravalent state, the technique has elicited
some interest, particularly for the determination of uranium.
Several attempts have been made to form uranium-sensitive
electrodes. An electrode based on embedding a uranyl complex of
an organophosphoric acid in a polyvinyl chloride matrix was
patented in 1975. A number of organophosphorous complexes
were subsequently studied for their possible application as
uranium-ion sensors. Several sensors showing near-Nernstian
response and linearity to uranium concentration in the range
—1 —4
10 to 10 M were identified. The optimum pH range was
2-3.5. The membranes are poisoned by Fe +. Solid state elec-
trodes fabricated from uranium alloyed with titanium, molybdenum,
or niobium were found to give a linear response proportional to
uranium concentration, but sensitivity was poor. Electrodes
of UOo' U3Si2,
 U S 2 ' U C 2 ' an^ U P •̂"•d n o t respond. Mem-
brane electrodes also were studied but response to uranium con-
centration was low and erratic.
Additional work on uranium-sensitive electrodes may be war-
ranted for on-line or at-line measurement of low concentrations
of uranium.
Specific-ion electrodes are of little or no interest for
measuring thorium or plutonium at this time,
10. X-Ray Fluorescence Techniques. Although x-ray fluo-
rescence measurements of SNM solutions have enjoyed wide exposure
in the literature, current safeguards applications are limited
because of competition from other less complex and less matrix-
dependent methods. Wavelengthand energy-dispersive systems have
been developed for analysis of reprocessing samples.
Analyses can be performed in the presence of fission products,
generally by limiting sample size, with RSDs of the order of 1-2%
(la). The methods have been automated to facilitate rapid analy-
sis of process samples without overexposure of personnel.
11. Density Methods. A density method has been described
for measuring thorium and uranium in their respective product
storage tanks at a thorium-uranium reprocessing facility.
Density, temperature, and acidity are monitored remotely, and
concentrations are computer-calculated using linear regression
techniques. The method is not element specific, and is of ques-
tionable value for nuclear safeguards applications.
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D_. Nondestructive Analysis Techniques
Nondestructive analysis (NDA) techniques generally rely on
measurement of phenomena associated with nuclear properties of
the element, and hence are generally isotope rather than element
sensitive. These may include neutron emission, gamma-ray emis-
sion, and calorimetry. In addition, x-ray and gamma-ray absorp-
tiometry, which rely on atomic, rather than nuclear, processes
and hence are element sensitive, are used.
Most NDA techniques will be adversely affected to some
5 by th
decay chains.
0 "3 0 }?&
degree by the high gamma background from the U and Th
1. Neutron Methods. Both passive and active neutron
methods can be used to measure fissionable isotopes of uranium
and plutonium. In passive neutron techniques either spontaneous
fission neutrons or neutrons produced by (a,n) reactions can be
used. Active neutron methods rely on measurement of prompt or
delayed neutrons after excitation by an external neutron source.
a^ Spontaneous Fission. The spontaneous-fission neu-
tron yields for the thorium, uranium, and plutonium isotopes are
summarized in Table III (Ref. 78) . The low spontaneous neutron
232
fission yields from all but U and the low and variable con-
centration of the latter preclude this technique as a method for
measuring thorium and uranium. Using coincidence-counting tech-
niques to discriminate spontaneous-fission neutrons from (a,n)
neutrons, the method can be used to measure plutonium in waste
79materials
b. ( a,n) Reactions. The (a,n) neutrons result from
reactions of alpha particles from the radioactive decay of ura-
nium or plutonium with light elements in the matrix material.
The neutron yield is a function of alpha-particle energy, the
(a,n) cross sections of the matrix elements, and the matrix con-
figuration. Furthermore, the alpha-particle intensity depends on
the isotopic composition and is particularly sensitive to the
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TABLE III
SPONTANEOUS FISSILE (S-F) OF FISSIONABLE ISOTOPES
OF Th, U, AND Pu
S-F Neutrons/





2 2.8 x 10~3
2 2.96 x 10"4
2 2.8 x 10"3
1.95 7.73 X 10"3
2.26 1.1 x 103
2.2 1.0 x 10~2
2.17 4.71 x 10 2
2.2 1.1 x 10"2 b
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2 3 2U and 238Pu contents. The assay of 2 3 3U by the (a,n)
reaction is complicated further by the grow-in of alpha-emitting
232
daughters of U, which result in a -v75% increase in alpha
activity from initial cleanup to equilibrium. As a consequence,
(a,n) neutrons ordinarily provide no quantitative signature for
Plutonium, and, in fact, they usually constitute a large back-
ground that must be eliminated from most measurements.
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c. Active Neutron Interrogation. Active methods of
252neutron analysis generally use a Cf source and coincidence
counting of induced-fission neutrons. Using thermal neutrons,
fission occurs primarily in the odd-numbered isotopes. The
233 235method has been used to measure U and U in scrap mate-
80
rials in a device referred to as the "shuffler". The tech-
nique also could be applied to measurement of in-process holdup
in areas such as pipes, filters, tanks, etc.
252
A method using a Cf source and measuring thermal and
epithermal neutrons has been described for measuring fissile
81
material in operating pulsed columns.
2. Gamma-Ray Emission. Gamma-ray emission techniques have
been applied to measurements of the various uranium and plutonium
242
isotopes, with the exception of Pu, which does not emit use-
ful gamma rays. However, a gamma spectrum from a sample of ten-
233 232
year-old U containing 250 ppm of U failed to show peaks
•yty
other than the U daughters (Ref. 4, p. 36). It is doubtful
if the method could be applied to the analysis of reprocessed
uranium from thorium-based samples with any degree of sensitivity
or reliability.
Gamma-ray spectroscopy can be used to measure the relative
isotopic abundances of the plutonium isotopes (with the exception
242
of Pu) in plutonium product materials, and to measure total
plutonium concentration. The relative isotopic ratios are
required for interpretation of calorimetric measurements or of
neutron coincidence measurements of spontaneous fission of
240 242
Pu and Pu. Relative isotopic measurements generally are ob-
tained by using gamma-ray energies in a narrow energy region to
minimize self-absorption effects, and by applying peak-stripping
and background-subtraction corrections with a computer. The
relative precision of this measurement can be better than 0.5%
(see Ref. 32, App. B) . Total plutonium concentrations between
0.1 and 400 g/L can be determined in a 30-min counting period




The solid low-level waste from the reprocessing plant may
be packaged in 55-gal drums for disposal, and should be analyzed
233 235
for U, U, and plutonium. A drum scanner that uses a Nal de-
239tector to measure the 414-keV gamma ray from Pu can detect
as little as 1 g of Pu in a 5-min scan. The relative
239
accuracy for measuring 10 g of Pu can be as good as 10% in
matrices of low atomic number and ranges to 50% in unknown
matrices. Hence/ the measurement accuracy will depend largely on
the administrative control exercised in sorting waste. This
instrument is in advanced development and requires only addi-
tional field testing and evaluation.
An indirect gamma-ray technique using the activity of the
208 2 3 2 233
Tl daughter of U has been developed for measuring U in
84 232 233
process scrap. The age of the waste, the U/ U ratio, and
thorium content must be known. Counting geometry and matrix com-
position also can affect results.
3. Gamma-Ray Absorption. Active gamma-absorption methods
have been proposed for plutonium solution assay. These methods
depend on absorption of a monoenergetic gamma ray by the pluto-
241 ft S ft fi
nium in the sample. Use of either Am (60 keV) ' or
51 Co (122 keV) (see Ref. 82, p. 18) has been proposed. An RSD
and relative accuracy of 1% are obtainable, but any variations
in matrix composition, including solvent, are measured as Pluto-
nium. Use of a dual-energy absorptiometer, where the second
energy is ^500 keV, can minimize solvent and light-element inter-
87
ferences, However/ any heavy-element contaminants such as
uranium, neptunium, and americium will be measured with the Plu-
tonium, and even elements of medium atomic number such as iron
will interfere.
The method also can be applied to the determination of tho-
rium and uranium, but the same considerations for interference
apply. The technique is of questionable value for safeguards
applications.
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4. X-Ray Absorption. Gross x-ray absorption using either
on pQ
polychromatic or monochromatic x-rays has been applied to
the determination of heavy elements. The method suffers fror
lack of elemental specificity as do gamma-absorption methods, and
any variation in impurity-element concentrations or matrix compo-
sition will be measured as changes in thorium, uranium, or pluto-
nium.
5. X-Ray Absorption-Edge Densitometry. Absorption-edge
densitometry is an element-specific analytical method that
can be applied in-line or at-line to most measurement situations
that are amenable to gross-absorption techniques. With proper
choice of cell path length and K- or LIIT-absorption edges,
Plutonium (or uranium) concentrations between 5 and 500 g/L can
be measured with a relative standard deviation of better than 1%.
90 91
Using the L T T T edges, uranium and plutonium con-
centrations between 5 and 40 g/L were measured with RSDs (la) in
the range between 0.34 and 1%. Using K-edge techniques, pluto-
nium in the concentration range between 150 and 500 g/L was mea-
sured with RSDs (la) in the range 0.2-0.5% (Ref. 92).
With a continuum x-ray source uranium and thorium or ura-
nium and plutonium solutions can be analyzed simultaneously with
RSDs ranging from ^5% to better than 1% (la) , depending on con-
93centration ranges and ratios. The method is applicable to
radioactive samples, and thus could be used as an in-line mea-
surement technique in reprocessing lines.
Use of a curved-crystal spectrometer as an energy filter
may enable measurements to be made of thorium and uranium in the
232 228
high gamma-radiation fields associated with U and Th
47daughters.
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6. Calorimetry. Calorimetry ' is a nondestructive-
assay technique based on measuring heat generated generally by
the radioactive decay of alpha-emitting isotopes. All but a
negligible part of the decay energy is transformed into heat when
the decay particles (alpha, beta, and low-energy gamma) are
54
absorbed by the sample and calorimeter walls. For plutonium
O O Q
samples most of the heat is generated by Pu. For uranium,
232
U and its decay daughters are the main source of heat.
232Because of the variability in U concentration through the
reprocessing plant and because most reprocessing plant samples
are liquids, it is doubtful whether calorimetry will have any
safeguards applications in the thorium fuel cycle.
E. Flow Measurement
Flow measurement instruments D in nuclear fuel reprocessing
plants are used principally for process control where high pre-
cision is not a major requirement. However, dynamic materials
measurement systems for safeguards accountability dictate accu-
rate and precise monitoring of materials flow as well as concen-
tration.
The most accurate means of measuring flow within a repro-
cessing plant is to follow the progress of batch transfers.
Batch volumes can be measured to high accuracies (+0.025 cm or
0.1% of scale, depending upon the system). Measurement of the
rate of change in tank inventory can give a highly accurate
indication of flow rate and is the best technique available.
Where materials accounting is handled by batch accumulation and
analysis, this method is the most convenient and accurate for
handling the accountability. Continuous rather than batch
transfer is used in the reprocessing area, and other means of
flow measurement are required.
Fluid transfers in reprocessing facilities often are exe-
cuted by airlifts to headpots, which provide gravity feed to the
various columns. Flow rates are determined by the inherent prop-
erties of the flowing liquid, although some control is possible
by varying the levels in the headpots or by throttling motive air
flow to the lift. Correlations of the lift rate with air-
injection flows can be used to monitor liquid transfers. Under
controlled and well-established conditions such as exist within
the reference plant, flow rates can be monitored to within
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5-10%. A few headpots are equipped with orifice meters that
should improve accuracy and precision to ̂ 1%.
Ejectors (jets) are frequently used for transfers, and are
preferred to mechanical pumps because they have no moving parts
and are essentially maintenance-free. Flow rates may be corre-
lated or calibrated with motive fluid pressure, fluid properties,
and system geometry. Ejectors are normally used only for trans-
fers, and the correlation of flow with operating conditions is
less accurate than with the air lift-headpot systems.
Magnetic flowmeters have been proposed for the EXXON fuel
97reprocessing plant. They are capable of measuring flow rates
to an accuracy of ^1%. A disadvantage of the magnetic flowmeter
is that it needs a conductive fluid for proper function and
therefore cannot be used in organic streams or in aqueous streams
having low salt content.
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The ultrasonic fiowmeter •*" is capable of measuring
flow with an accuracy of better than 1%. Transducers can be
mounted either in the pipe or exterior to the pipe wall so that
intrusion into the pipe is not necessary. Pipe diameter is a
limiting factor: diameters >4 cm (1.5 in.) are generally recom-
mended. Interference by entrained air can be eliminated by
transducer and detector-circuit design. The use of ultra-
sonic flowmeters and extrinsic factors affecting measurement
accuracy have been reviewed by Managan.
A bubble flowmeter is under evaluation at the Idaho Falls
Chemical Separations Plant for measurement of low flow rates,
such as may be encountered in product concentrator lines.
This flowmeter measures the transit time of a small bubble in-
jected into the flowing stream. Ultrasonic detectors mounted on
the outside of the line detect the passage of the injected
bubbles.
F. Volume Measurement
Volume determinations usually are inferred from the mea-
sured liquid level in a calibrated tank. At present, the best
56
developed liquid-level measuring system for use in nuclear facil-
ities is the dip-tube manometer, or pneumatic bubbler. When com-
bined with a commercially available electromanometer, such sys-
tems can have a detection sensitivity of 0.25 mm of water.
Furthermore, the instrument output is directly computer-
compatible. With careful calibration and an effective
measurement-control program, calibration errors approaching 0.1%
RSD and single volume-measurement errors of 0.5% or less should
be attainable.
G. Weighing Methods
Load-cell weighing systems are particularly well suited for
measuring bulk quantities of material in nuclear reprocessing
plants, and may be used for accountability and product tank mea-
surements. The weighing platform can be separated physically from
the associated electronics and readout mechanism. Only the plat-
form need be exposed to the environment of a glovebox or process
area, and the electronics can be located elsewhere to provide
ready access for calibration and maintenance.
Load cells having 10-, 100-, and 1000-kg capacities are
available commercially. These units have the following measure-





Determination by weighing the mass of solution in large
process tanks and vessels would be the most direct method of ob-
taining this information, but successful use of load cells for
such measurements has not yet been demonstrated. The Idaho
Chemical Processing Plant has evaluated the in-plant performance
of a load-cell weighing system on an existing input account-
ability tank. Because of large thermal forces generated in
the tank and attached piping, it was impossible to attain the
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measurement accuracy for which the weighing system was designed.
The study showed that to obtain useful accuracy, tanks installed
on weighing systems must be specially designed for the applica-
tion. Load cells also are being evaluated for the Japanese Tokai-
Mura reprocessing plant.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A preliminary conceptual design for a safeguards materials-
management system for a 1500-MT/yr thorium-based nuclear fuel
reprocessing plant has been proposed. The preliminary plant
design is based on a combination of Purex and Thorex reprocessing
technology to produce separate thorium, uranium, and plutoniuin
product streams. No attempt is made to maintain the isotopic
233 235
integrity of U and U reprocessing streams except by
campaigning these fuels separately. The materials flows and
reprocessing schemes are summarized in Chap. III.
The materials-measurement and accounting system combines
recently developed NDA technology, state-of-the-art conventional
measurement methods, special in-plant sensors, process instru-
mentation, and powerful data analysis techniques, supported by
computer and data base management technology, and is described in
Chap. IV. Various materials-measurement philosophies will be
modeled to determine the most effective scheme for dividing the
plant into materials balance areas (MBAs). The key measurement
points are the accountability tank and the plutonium and uranium
product storage tanks. Concentration-volume measurements in the
accountability tank will be made by isotope-dilution mass spec-
trometry and dip-tube manometers. The product storage tanks will
be monitored for concentration using conventional analytical
chemical techniques, and for volume or mass using either dip-tube
manometers or load cells. Additional MBAs may be drawn around
the fission product decontamination-partitioning section and the
three product purification areas using in-line NDA techniques
combined with flow measurements. In-line or at-line measurements
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for thorium, uranium, and plutonium separately or in binary or
ternary combinations have been proposed using x-ray absorption-
edge densitometry, alpha monitors, polarography, or x-ray fluo-
rescence, supported by conventional analytical chemistry. The
applicability of both conventional and NDA techniques to process
streams that may contain significant background radiation from
U and Th daughters must be demonstrated. Measurement tech-
nology as it may apply to the thorium fuels reprocessing plant is
summarized in Chap. V.
The effectiveness of any particular measurement control
strategy is a complicated function of many factors including
operating procedures, management philosophy, and process con-
straints. For reliability and credibility, the evaluation and
selection process requires computerized modeling and simulation
methodology coupled with powerful decision analysis
tools. ' Our experience has shown that a specific
facility must be modeled to maintain the necessary contact with
reality; in this case, a final design to be selected by SRL will
be the reference facility. Accountability measurement techniques
(based on the best available estimates of performance and sensi-
tivity) and the statistical sampling plans will be applied to the
simulated SNM inventories. Alternative accounting and diversion
strategies will be evaluated and compared using analysis tools
adapted for this purpose. Recommendations made on the basis of




The author gratefully acknowledges the helpful suggestions
and criticism of D. D. Cobb and C. A. Ostenak of the Q-4 staff;
S. Balogna of the Office of Safeguards and Security, DOE; J. E.
Rush ton of the ORNL; J. P. Hamric, DOE/100; A. L. Camp of the
Sandia Laboratory; L. A. Heinrich of the Savannah River Labora-
tory; W. Lawless, DOE/SRO; and L. Abraham, G. E. Benedict, H. C.
Carney, N. D« Holder, E. M. Knox, J. J. Shefcik, and R. G.
Wilbourn of the General Atomic Company. The manuscript was pre-
pared by Sharon Klein.
60
REFERENCES
1. F. E. Driggers and T. T. Thompson, "Program Plan for Re-
search and Development in Support of Thorium Fuel Cycle
Technologies," Savannah River Laboratory report DPST-TFCT-
77-100 (September 1977).
2. F. E. Driggers, "Reference Thorium Fuel Cycle," Savannah
River Laboratory report DPST-TFCT-77-101 (September 1977) .
3. M. Benedict and T. H. Pigford, Nuclear Chemical Engineering
(McGraw-Hill BOOK Company, Inc., New York, 1957) p. 258.
4. J. D. Jenkins, S. R. McNeany, and J. E. Rushton, "Concep-
tual Design of the Special Nuclear Material Nondestructive
Assay and Accountability System for the HTGR Fuel Refabri-
cation Pilot Plant," Oak Ridge National Laboratory report
ORNL-TM-4917 (July 1975).
5. A. L. Lotts and P. R. Kasten, "Gas-Cooled Reactor Programs,
Thorium Utilization Program Progress Report July 1, 1975-
September 30, 1976," Oak Ridge National Laboratory report
ORNL-5266 (July 1977).
6. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Energy Technology,
Division of Nuclear Power Development, "Barnwell Nuclear
Fuels Plant Applicability Study," Department of Energy
report DOE/ET-0040/3 (March 1978) Appendix B, p. B-28.
7. So M. Stoller and R. B. Richards, Eds., Reactor Handbook.
Vol. II. Fuel Reprocessing, (Interscience Publishers, Inc. ,
New York, 1961), p. 217.
8. A. T. Gresky, "The Separation of U^33 an(g Thorium from
Fission Products by Solvent Extraction," in Progress In
Nuclear Energy, Series III, Process Chemistry, I, (Pergamon
Press Ltd., London, 1956), p. 220.
9. H. C. Rathvon, A. G. Blasewitz, R. Maher, Jo C. Eargle,
Jr., and A. E. Wible, "Recovery of 23-3u from Irradiated
ThorJ.a," in Thorium Fuel Cycle, R. G. Wymer, Ed., Pro-
ceedings of Second International Thorium Fuel Cycle Sym-
posium, Gatlinburg, Tennessee, May 3-6, 1966, U.S. Atomic
Energy Commission report CONF-660524 (February 1968), p.
793.
10. E. L. Nicholson, L. M. Ferris, J. R. Flanary, J. H. Goode,
B. A. Hannaford, J, W. Landry, J. G. Moore, R. H. Rainey,
C. D. Watson, and H. 0. Witte, "Recent Developments in
Thorium Fuel Reprocessing," in Thorium Fuel Cycle, R. G.
Wymer, Ed., Proceedings of Second International Thorium
61
Fuel Cycle Symposium, Gatlinburg, Tennessee, May 3-6, 1966,
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission report CONF-660524 (February
1968), p. 608-610.
11. J. H. Goode and J. G. Moore, "Adsorption of Protactinium on
Unf/red Vycor: Final Hot-Cell Experiments," Oak Ridge
National Laboratory report ORNL-3950 (June 1967).
12. "Final Environmental Statement, Light Water Breeder Reactor
Program," U.S. Energy Research and Development Administra-
tion report ERDA-1541 (June 1976).
13. F. E. Driggers, "Spent Thorium LWR Fuel Specificationsr"
Savannah River Laboratory report DPST-TFCT-78-101 (April
1978) .
14. W. 0. Allen, D. J. Stoker, and A. V. Campise.. "Fast Breeder
Reactors with Mixed Fuel Cycles," in Thorium Fuel Cycle, R.
G. Wymer, Ed., Proceedings of Second International Thorium
Fuel Cycle Symposium, Gatlinburg, Tenn., May 3-6, 1966,
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission report CONF-660524, (February
1968) , pp. 81-90.
15. B. R. Sehgal, J. A. Naser, C. L. Lin, and W. B.
Loewenstein, "Thorium-Based Fuels in Fast Breeder Reac-
tors," Nucl. Tech. 35, 635-650 (1977).
16. K. J. Notz, "An Overview of HTGR Fuel Recycle," Oak Ridge
National Laboratory report ORNL-TM-4747 (January 1976).
17. E. Teuchert and H. J. Rutten, "Core Physics and Fuel Cycles
of the Pebble Bed Reactor," Nucl. Eng. and Design 34,
108-119 (1975) .
18. G. Ivens, "AVR-HTR Operating Experience," in Gas-Cooled
Reactors; HTGR and GCFBR, P. R. Hasten, Ed., Proceedings of
a Symposium, American Nuclear Society, Gatlinburg,
Tennessee, May 4-10, 1974, U.S. Energy Research and
Development Administration report CONF-740501 (May 1974),
pp. 34-49.
19. E. Critoph, "The Thorium Fuel Cycle in Water-Moderated
Reactor Systems," International Conference on Nuclear Power
and Its Fuel Cycle, Salzburg, Austria, May 2-13, 1977
(International Atomic Energy Agency), paper No.
IAEA-CN-36/177.
20. "Barnwell Nuclear Fuels Plant Separations Facility—Final
Safety Analysis Report," Docket 50-332, Allied-General
Nuclear Services, October 10, 1973.
62
21. J. I. Bramman, R. M. Sharpe, D. Thorn, and G. Yates,
"Metallic Fission-Product Inclusions in Irradiated Oxide
Fuels," J. Nucl. Mater. 2J5f 201-215 (1968).
22. K. H. Lin, "Characteristics of Radioactive Waste Streams
Generated in HTGR Fuel Reprocessing," Oak Ridge National
Laboratory report ORNL-5096 (January 1976), p. 5.
23. K. H. Lin and W. E. Clark, "High-Level Solid Wastes from
HTGR Fuel Reprocessing," Oak Ridge National Laboratory
report GCR-77/10 (August 1977).
24. C. L. Fitzgerald, V. C. A. Vaughen, K. J. Notz, and R. S.
Lowrie, "Head-End Reprocessing Studies with Irradiated
HTGR-Typs Fuels," Oak Ridge National Laboratory report
ORNL-5090 (November 1975).
25. "Conceptual Design Summary and Design Qualifications for
HTGR Target Recycle Plant," General-Atomic Company report
GA-A 13365 (April 1975).
26. M. C. Thompson, Savannah River Laboratory, personal com-
munication to J. W. Barnes, April 12, 1978.
27. J. M. de Montmollin and R. B. Walton, "The Design of
Integrated Safeguards Systems for Nuclear Facilities,"
Nucl. Mater. Manage. V(III), 317-332 (1976).
28« L. D» Chapman, J. M. de Montmollin, J. E. Deveney, W. C.
Fienning, J. W. Hickman, L. D. Watkins, and A. E. Winblad,
"Development of an Engineered Safeguards System Concept
for a Mixed-Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility," Sandia
Laboratories report SAND76-0180 (August 1976).
29. W. C. Fienning, A. E. Winblad, and J. P. Shipley, "A Pre-
liminary Concept Definition of a Combined Safeguards Sys-
tem for a Mixed-Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility,"Sandia
Laboratories report SAND77-0224 (October 1977).
30. J. P. Shipley, D. D. Cobb, R. J. Dietz, M. L. Evans, E. P.
Schelonka, D. B. Smith, and R. B. Walton, "Coordinated
Safeguards for Materials Management in a Mixed-Oxide Fuel
Facility," Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory report LA-6536
(February 1977).
31. E. A. Hakkila, D. D. Cobb, H. A. Dayem, R. J. Dietz, E. A.
Kern, E. P. Schelonka, J. P. Shipley, D. B. Smith, R. H.
Augustson, and J. W. Barnes, "Coordinated Safeguards for
Materials Management in a Fuel Reprocessing Plant," Los
Alamos Scientific Laboratory report LA-6881 (September
1977).
63
32. H. A. Dayem, D. D. Cobb, R. J. Dietz, E. A. Hakkila, E. A.
Kern, J. P. Shipley, D. 3. Smith, and D. F. Bowersox,
"Coordinated Safeguards for Materials Management in a
Nitrate-to-Oxide Conversion Facility," Los Alamos Scien-
tific Laboratory report LA-7C11 (April 1978).
33. W. D. ChadwicK, W. C. Fienning, B. G. Self, and G. E.
Rochau, "A Concept Definition of an Engineered Safeguards
System for a Spent Fuel Reprocessing Facility," Sandia
Laboratories report (to be published).
34. J. P. Shipley, "The Structure of Safeguards Systems," Los
Alamos Scientific Laboratory report LA-7337-MS (May 1978) .
35. R. H. Augustson, "Development of In-Plant Real Time Mate-
rials Control: The DYMAC Program," Nucl. Mater. Manage.
V(III) , 302-316 (1976) .
36. G. R. Keepin and W. J. Maraman, "Nondestructive Assay
Technology and In-Plant Dynamic Materials Control—
DYMAC," in Safeguarding Nuclear Materials, Proc. Symp.,
Vienna, 1975 (International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna,
1976) paper IAEA-SM-201/32, pp. 305-320.
37. J. H. Fuchs, D. M. Kisner, R. K. McClean, H. R. Milder, K.
Mizuba.- and G. E. Short, "Unified Safeguards Information
System Concept," TRW Defense and Space Systems Group
report 32076-6001-RU-00 (May 20, 1977).
38. D. M. Kisner, H. R. Milder, and K. Mizuba, "Preliminary
Hardware Configuration Recommendations for Safeguards
Information System," TRW Defense and Space Systems Group
report 31134-6001-RU-00 (May 24, 1977).
39. E. P. Schelonka, "Availability Analysis for High-
Reliability Computer Systems in Nuclear Facilities," Proc.
18th Annual Meeting of the Institute of Nuclear Materials
Management, Washington, DC., June 29-July 1, 1977.
40. R. A. Howard, "Decision Analysis: Perspectives on Infer-
ence, Decision, and Experimentation," Proc. IEEE, Special
Issue on Detection Theory and Applications _58̂  No. 5,
632-643 (May 1970).
41. J. P. Shipley, "Decision Analysis in Safeguarding Special
Nuclear Material," invited paper, Trans. Am. Nucl. Soc.
2J_, 178 (1977) .
42. James P. Shipley, "Decision Analysis for Nuclear Safe-
guards," in Nondestructive and Analytical Chemical Tech-
niques for Nuclear Safeguards, E. A. Hakkila, Ed., (Amer-
ican Chemical Society, Washington, DC, in press).
64
43. James P. Shipley, "Decision Analysis for Dynamic Account-
ing of Nuclear Material," Presented at the American Nu-
clear Society Topical Meeting on Analytical Methods for
Safeguards and Accountability Measurement of Special Nu-
clear Material, Williamsburg, Virginia, May 15-17, 1978.
44. N. A. Wogman, R. L. Brodzinski, and D. P. Brown, "An
Instrument for Monitoring the Transuranic Content of
Chopped Leached Hulls from Spent Nuclear Fuel Elements,"
Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories report PNL-SA-6652
(March 1978).
45. K. J. Hofstetter, B. C. Henderson, J. H. Gray, and G. A.
Huff, "Non-Destructive Assay of Leached Hulls for Undis-
solved Reactor Fuel," Presented at the ANS Topical Meet-
ing on Analytical Methods for Safeguards and Account-
ability Measurement of Special Nuclear Material,
Williamsburg, Virginia, May 15-17, 1978.
46. C. R. Hudgens and B= D. Craft, "Feasibility Study of the
Proposed Use of Automated X-Ray Fluorescence Analysis for
Measurement of U and Pu in Dissolver Tanks," Monsanto
Research Corporation, unpublished report (May 1978) .
47. J. W. Tape, T. R. Canada, and E. A. Hakkila, "Application
of Dispersive X-Ray Filtering Techniques to Absorption
Edge Analysis," in Nuclear Safeguards Research and Devel-
opment Program Status Report January-April 1977, Los
Alamos Scientific Laboratory report LA-6849-PR (August
1977) pp. 10-11.
48. E. A. Hakkila, "A Critical Review of Analytical Tech-
niques for Safeguarding the Thorium-Uranium Fuel Cycle,"
Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory report LA-7372 (in press).
49. National Bureau of Standards, "Catalog of NBS Standard
Reference Materials," NBS Special Publ. 260 (1975).
50. F. B. Stephens, R. G. Gutmacher, K. Ernst, J. E. Harrar,
and S. P. Turel, "Methods for the Accountability of Ura-
nium Dioxide," US Nuclear Regulatory Commission report
NUREG-75/010 (June 1975), p. 5-17.
51. K. F. Lauer and Y. LeDuigou, "Proper Use of Reference
Materials for the Accurate Determination of Uranium, Plu-
tonium, and Thorium in the Nuclear Fuel Cycle," in
Analytical Methods in the Nuclear Fuel Cycle, Proc. Symp.,
Vienna, November 29-December 3, 1971 (International Atomic
Energy Agency, Vienna, 1972), pp. 145-152.
52. J. E. Rein, S. F. Marsh, G. C. Swanson, G. R. Waterbury,
G. L. Tietjen, and R. K. Ziegler, "Preparation of Working
65
Calibration and Test Materials: Plutonium Nitrate Solu-
tion," Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory and US Nuclear
Regulatory Commission report LA-NUREG-6348 (January 1977).
53. A. M. Voeks, M. M. Trahey, and J. M. Scarborough, "Prepa-
ration of Test Materials for an Interlaboratory Compari-
son Program on NDA Physical Standards," in Analytical
Chemistry in Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing, W. S. Lyon, Ed.,
(Science Press, Princeton, 1978) pp. 338-344.
54. V. Wenzel and H. J. Riedel, "Actinide Composition Studies
on Thorium/Uranium Fuel Elements with Known Irradiation
Data," in Analytical Methods in the Nuclear Fuel Cycle,
Proc. Syrnp." Vienna, November 29-December ~, 1971 (Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, 1972), pp. 549-562.
55. D. D. Jackson, R. M. Hollen, S. F. Marsh, M. R. Ortiz, and
J. E. Rein, "Determination of Submilligram Amounts of
Uranium with the LASL Automated Spectrophotometer," in
Analytical Chemistry in Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing, W. S.
Lyon, Ed., (Science Press, Princeton, 1978) pp. 126-133.
56. D. D. Jackson, D. J. Hodgkins, R. M. Hollen, and J. E.
Rein, "Automated Spectrophotometer for Plutonium and Ura-
nium Determination," Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory
report LA-6091 (February 1976).
57. G. Phillips, "Precise Determination of Plutonium by Dif-
ferential Spectrophotometry," Analyst 83_, 75-79 (1958).
58. C. E. Michelson and K. Koyama, "Process Polarography:
Some Problems in the Automatic Determination of Uranium in
Nitric Acid," Hanford Atomic Products Operation report
HW-42637 (April 1956).
59. K. Motojima, H. Okashita, and T. Sakamoto, "Polarographic
Determination of Uranium in the Waste Solution of Nuclear
Fuel Reprocessing," Japan Analyst L3, 1097-1100 (1964).
60. K. Motojima and K. Katsuyaraa, "Polarographic Determina-
tion of Uranium in the Reprocessing of Nuclear Fuel,"
Japan Analyst Y2_, 358-363 (1963).
61. B. G. Brodda, P. Filss, H. Kirchner, and U. Wenzel,
"Analysis and Material Accounting in the Reprocessing of
HTGR Nuclear Fuels," Kernforschungsanlage Julich reoort
JUL-1033-CT (December 1973).
62. R. E. Perrin, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, personal
communication, January 1977.
66
63. R. A. Schneider and K. M. Harmon, "Analytical Technical
Manual," Hanford Atomic Product Operation report HW-53363
(February 1961).
64. U. C. Upson, "Scintillation Glasses for Alpha Counting,"
Hanford Laboratories report HW-72512 (January 1962).
65. K. J. Hofstetter, G. M. Tucker, R. P. Kemrr.erlin, J. H.
Gray, and G. A. Huff, "Application of On-Line Alpha Moni-
tors to Process Streams in a Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing
Plant," in Nuclear Safeguards Analysis: Nondestructive and
Analytical Chemical Techniques, E. A Hakkila, Ed., (Amer-
ican Chemical Society, Washington, DC, in press).
66. M. W. Lerner, "Evaluation of the Methods in T1D-7029,
Selected Measurement Methods for Plutonium and Uranium in
the Nuclear Fuel Cycle," New Brunswick Laboratory report
NBL-231 (February 1966).
67. American Society for Testing Materials, 1974 Annual Book
of ASTM Standards, Part 45, Nuclear Standards (ASTM,
Philadelphia, 1974), pp. 709-714.
68. B. Fleet and A. Y. W. Ho, "Applications of Ion-Selective
Electrodes in Continuous Analysis," in Ion Selective
Electrodes, Symposium held at Matrafured, Hungary, October
23-25, 1972, E. Pungor, Ed., (Akademiai Krado, Budapest,
1973) pp. 17-35.
69. W. C. Dietrich and D. L. Manning, "Uranium Sensitive
Electrode Membrane," U. S. Patent No. 3 864 233, February
1975.
70. D. L. Manning, J. R. Stokely, and D. W. Magouyrk, "Studies
on Several Uranyl Organophosphorus Compounds in a Poly
(Vinyl Chloride) (PVC) Matrix as Ion Sensors for Uranium,"
Anal. Chem. 46, 1116-1119 (1974).
71. W. D. Spall, M. R. Ortiz, and S. F. Marsh, "Specific Ion
Electrodes as Detectors," in Examination of Fast Reactor
Fuels, FBR Analytical Quality Assurance Standards and
Methods, and Analytical Methods Development-Irradiation
Tests July 1-September 30, 1977, R. D. Baker, Ed., Los
Alamos Scientific Laboratory report LA-7038-PR (November
1977), p. 15.
72. B. G. Brodda, H. Lammertz, H. Maselter, and J. Vieth,
"Remotely Controlled Computer-Guided Preparation Facility
for X~Ray Fluorescence Measurement Samples at a Fuel
Reprocessing Plant," Kerntechnik 9-10, 433-444 (1977).
67
73. A. von Baeckman, D. Ertel, and J. Neuber, "Determination
of Actinide Elements in Nuclear Fuels by X-Ray Analysis,"
Advan. X-Ray Anal. _18, 62-74 (1975).
74. D. Ertel, "Simultaneous Determination of Uranium and Plu-
tonium in Inactive Purex Processes by X-Ray Fluores-
cence," J. Radioanal. Chem. 2_, 2C5-209 (1969).
75. G. Malet and G. Charpentier, "Simultaneous Determination
of Uranium and Plutonium by X-Ray Fluorescence in, the
Reprocessing of Rhapsodie Fuel," in Analytical Methods in
the Nuclear Fuel Cycle, Proc. Symp., Vienna, November 29-
December 3, 197.1 (International Atomic Energy Agency,
Vienna, 1972), pp. 343-352.
76. W. L. Pickles and J. L. Gate, Jr., "Quantitative Nondis-
persive X-Ray Fluorescence Analysis of Highly Radioactive
Samples for Uranium and Plutonium Concentration," Univer-
sity of California Radiation Laboratory report UCRL-74717
(August 1973) .
77. B. G. Brodda, "Establishing the Calibration Functions for
In-Line Determinations of Uranium and Thorium in Various
Process Flows of the Experimental Jupiter Reprocessing
Plant," Julich Nuclear Research Institute report
JUL-968-CT (June 1973).
78. W. Schirmer and N. Wachter, "Table of Specific Activities
of the Nuclides with Z=88 to Z=104," Actinides Review 1̂ ,
125-134 (1968).
79. R. H. Augustson and T. D. Reilly, "Fundamentals of Passive
Nondestructive Assay of Fissionable Material," Los Alamos
Scientific Laboratory report LA-5651-M (September 1974).
80. T. W. Crane, D. A. Close, M. S. Krick, and H. 0. Menlove,
"Neutron Methods for Assay of Fissionable Material in the
Presence of Fission Products," in Analytical Chemistry in
Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing, W. S. Lyon, Ed. (Science Press,
Princeton, 1978) pp. 285-291.
81. G. Schulze and H. Wurz, "In-Line Determination of Fissile
Material in High-Activity Solutions," Nucl. Technology 35,
663-670 (1977). '
82. T. R. Canada, D. G. Langner, J. L. Parker, and E. A.
Hakkila, "Gamma- and X-Ray Techniques for the Nondes-
tructive Assay of Special Nuclear Material in Solution,"
in Coordinated Safeguards for Materials Management in a
Fuel Reprocessing Plant, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory
report LA-6881 (September 1977), Vol. II, App. A.
68
83. R. B. Walton, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, personal
communication, September 1977.
84. V. A. DeCarlo, "Design of a System for the Nondestructive
Assay of 233y in waste Drums," Oak Ridge National Labo-
ratory report ORNL-TM-4249 (August 1973) .
85. D. G. Miller, "Americium-241 as a Photon Source for the
Gamma Absorptiometric Technique," US Atomic Energy Commis-
sion report HW-39971 (1955) .
86. D. R. Terry and A. P. Dixium, "A Portable Gamma Absorpti-
ometer for Safeguards Use in Nuclear Fuel Processing
Plants," Atomic Weapons Research Establishment,
Aldermaston report AWRE/44/88/28 Cos 28 (June 1975).
87. J. S. Stutheit, "Dual-Energy Absorptiometer," E. I. duPont
de Nemours and Co. report DPSPU 68-30-9 (January 1969) .
88. M. C. Lambert, "Chemical Analysis by X-Ray Photometry,"
Hanford Works report HW-30634 (January 1954) .
89. Progress Report, Research Contract N1565/RB, "Testing and
Demonstration of Automation of the Nuclear Material
Accountability Control of Irradiated Fuel Reprocessing
Facilities," Impianto EUREX, Saluggia, Italy (August 1975).
90. E. A. Hakkila, "X-Ray Absorption Edge Determination of
Uranium in Complex Mixtures," Anal. Chem. 3_3_, 1012-1015
(1961).
91. E. A. Hakkila, R. G. Hurley, and G. R. Waterbury, "Three-
Wavelength X-Ray Absorption Edge Method for Determination
of Plutonium in Nitrate Media," Anal. Chem. 2£/ 425-427
(1966) .
92. K. J. Hofstetter, G. A. Huff, R. Gunnink, J. E. Evans, and
A. L. Prindle, "On-Line Measurement of Total and Isotopic
Plutonium Concentrations by Gamma-Ray Spectrometry," in
Analytical Chemistry in Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing, W. S.
Lyon, Ed., (Science Press, Princeton, 1978) , pp. 26*6-271.
93. T. R. Canada, D. G. Langner, and J. W. Tape, "Nuclear
Safeguards Applications of Energy Dispersive Absorption
Edge Densitometry," in Nondestructive and Analytical Chem-
ical Techniques in Nuclear Safeguards, IT h~. Hakkila"^ Ed.,
(American Chemical Society, Washington, DC, in press).
94. F. A. O'Hara, J. D. Nutter, W. W. Rodenburg, and M. L.
Dinsmore, "Calorimetry for Safeguards Purposes," Mound
Laboratory report MLM-1798 (January 1972).
69
95. American National Standards Institute: Calibration Tech-
niques for the Calorimetric Assay of Plutonium-Bearing
Solids Applied to Nuclear Materials Control, ANSI N15.22
(1975) .
96. J. W. Barnes, "Flow Measurement Technology," in Coordi-
nated Safeguards for Materials Management in a Fuel
Reprocessing Plant, Vol. II, App. Bf Los Alamos Scien-
tific Laboratory report LA-6881 (September 1977).
97. "Nuclear Fuel Recovery and Recycling Center, Preliminary
Safety Analysis Report," Docket 50-564, EXXON Nuclear
Company.
98. J. L. McShane, "Ultrasonic Flowmeters," in Flow, Its Mea-
surement and Control in Science and Industry, R. B.
Dowdell, Ed.-in-Chief (Instrument Society of America,
Pittsburgh, 1974) Vol. I, Part 2, pp. 897-915.
99. L. C. Lynnworth, N. E. Pedersen, E. P. Papadakis, and J.
H. Bradshaw, "Nonintrusive Ultrasonic Measurement of Flow
Velocity and Mass Flow Rate," in Flow, Its Measurement
and Control in Science and Industry, R. B. Dowdell,
Ed.-in-Chief (Instrument Society of America, Pittsburgh,
1974) Vol. I, Part 2, pp. 917-924.
100. W. H. Lynch and A. E. Brown, "Flow Measurement with a New
Ultrasonic Flowmeter," in Flow, Its Measurement and Con-
trol in Science and Industry, R. B. Dowdell, Ed.-in-Chief
(Instrument Society of America, Pittsburgh, 1974) Vol. I,
Part 2, pp. 925-931.
101. Envirotech, Sparling Division, Series 500 Flowmeters,
Technical Data Sheet (1975) .
102. W. W. Managan, "Extrinsic Factors Affecting Accuracy of
Ultrasonic Flowmeters for LMFBRs," Argonne National Labo-
ratory report ANL-CT-76-40 (1976).
103. H. R. Deveraux and W. J. Harris, "Transit Time Flow-
meter," in Technical Division Quarterly Progress Report
October 1-December 31, 1976, C~. W. Slansky, Ed., Allied
Chemical Corporation report ICP-1111 (March 1977).
104. D. B. Smith, "A Critical Review of Volume Measurement
Technology," in Coordinated Safeguards for Materials Man-
agement in a Fuel Reprocessing Plant, Vol. II, App. C,
Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory report LA-6881
(September 1977) .
105. F. M. Groth and F. O. Cartan, "Evaluation of Instrumenta-
tion for Nuclear Fuels Reprocessing Plant Input Weight








H. E. Lyon, DOE/OSS
S. C. T. McDowell, DOE/OSS
G. Hammond, DOE/OSS
S. Balogna, DOE/OSS

























P. 0. Box 1608
San Diego, CA 92138
P. Persiani
Argonne National Laboratory




Oak Ridge National Laboratory
P. O. Box X
















P. 0. Box 847
Barnwell, SC 29812
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1978—677-013/177
71
